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INTRODUCTION

"[T]heory is somewhat lagging behind the facts and developing only
in reaction to these facts," argues C.W.A. Timmermans regarding the
European Community's (the EC or the Community) legal basis for
extending its external power.' The Community tends to extend its external competence before having a clear authority for doing so and only
later provides a post hoc rationale. This observation suggests that the
justification, not the propriety, of a newly acquired external competence
is the question. Nowhere is this modus operandi better illustrated, or
more sorely tested, than by the Community's growing involvement with
and pursuit of international intellectual property issues. Indeed, not only
has the EC begun to act before having an obvious or agreed upon legal
basis, but it also does so in the face of argument that it cannot.
The parameters of the Community's external powers vis a vis the
Members States' defy easy definition. Generally stated, once the Community exercises external competence in a particular field, the Member
States' power correspondingly decreases. 2 Actual practice, however,
presents a far more complicated picture. There exist two sources for
external Community power: explicit, which are based upon provisions
within the Treaty of Rome (the Treaty), particularly Article 113 ;3 and
implicit (or implied), which are derived from internal Community competence. External powers derived from explicit sources are exclusive to
the Community; no Member State may pursue actions that may affect

1. C.W.A. Timmermans, Division of External Powers Between Community and Member
States in the Field of Harmonizationof National Law-A Case Study, in DIVISION OF POWERS
BETWEEN

THE EUROPEAN

COMMUNITIES

AND THEIR MEMBER STATES IN THE FIELD OF

EXTERNAL RELATIONS 15, 15 (C.W.A. Timmermans & E.L.M. V61ker eds., 1981) [hereinafter
DIVISION OF POWERS].

2. See, e.g., Ulrich Everling, The Law of the External Economic Relations of the European Community, in THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND GATT 85, 86-89 (Meinhard Hilf et al.

eds., 1986) (Studies in Transnational Economic Law Vol. 4); Richard Lauwaars, Scope and
Exclusiveness of the Common Commercial Policy-Limits of the Powers of the Member
States, in DISCRETIONARY POWERS OF THE MEMBER STATES IN THE FIELD OF ECONOMIC
POLICIES AND THEIR LIMITS UNDER THE

EEC

TREATY

73 (Jirgen Schwarze ed., 1988); F.

Burrows, The Effects of the Main Cases of the Court of Justice in the Field of External Competencies on the Conduct of member States, in DIVISION OF POWERS, supra note l, at I 1,
111-12.
3. See also TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY arts. 111,
238, reprinted in 298 U.N.T.S. 11 (1958) [hereinafter EEC TREATY]. For a discussion of
Articles 111 and 238, see infra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.

Fall 1994]

Intellectual Property and External Power of the EC

189

explicit Community external competence. 4 The exclusivity of implicit
external powers, however, is far more problematic. Implicit external
powers stem from internal Community provisions that necessarily require an external power in order to realize the internal goals. 5 Exclusivity of such external powers depends upon the extent such powers are
exclusive internally or, in other words, upon the intensity of the internal
arrangement. 6 Ultimately, the issue becomes a question of interpretation.
Nevertheless, if the Community acts internationally regarding intellectual
property issues, the Member States should refrain from undertaking any
domestic or international actions that might affect the Community's
endeavors. 7 In short, they cannot pursue their own agendas. This, however, has not happened.
Although the Community pursues intellectual property issues, the
Member States also continue to act internationally. The majority belong
to organizations such as the World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO) and are also parties to the Berne and Rome Conventions. 8 More
significantly, the Treaty of Rome refers to intellectual property, or
"industrial and commercial property," only in Article 36, which specifically permits Member States to derogate from the single market idea to
protect their intellectual property rights. 9 The Court of Justice observed

4. See Case 22/70, Commission v. Council, 1971 E.C.R. 263, 274 [hereinafter ERTA].
"[E]ach time the Community, with a view to implementing a common policy envisaged by
the Treaty, adopts provisions laying down common rules, whatever form these may take, the
Member States no longer have the right, acting individually or even collectively, to undertake
obligations with third countries which affect those rules." Id.
5. Opinion 1/76, Opinion Given Pursuant to Article 228(1) of the EEC Treaty, 1977
E.C.R. 741, 755.
6. See E.L.M. VOLKER, BARRIERS TO EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL COMMUNITY TRADE
KAPTEYN & P. VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT, INTRODUCTION TO THE
LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 773-74 (Laurence W. Gormley ed., 2d ed. 1990).

199-200 (1993); P.J.G.

7. See ERTA, 1971 E.C.R. at 275; see also VOLKER, supra note 6, at 199 ("In addition,
[the Court] made clear [in subsequent decisions] that external exclusivity also results from the
usage of the implied power itself, where it had not become exclusive already by the use of the
internal power from which it isderived."); Inge Govaere, Intellectual Property Protectionand
Commercial Policy, in THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY'S COMMERCIAL POLICY AFTER 1992: THE
LEGAL DIMENSION 197, 209 (Marc Maresceau ed., 1993) [hereinafter THE LEGAL DIMENSION]
("[Tlhe adoption of new national intellectual property legislation would also run counter to
the spirit of the common commercial policy and be contrary to Article 5 EEC.").
8. Beme Convention For the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, as
revised at Paris Jul. 24, 1971, 1161 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Berne Convention]; International
Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting
Organizations, Oct. 26, 1961, 496 U.N.T.S. 43 [hereinafter Rome Convention]. Only Belgium
and the Republic of Ireland, being signatories of the earlier text, do not belong to the Berne
Convention while Greece, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain as well as Belgium are not sig-

natories to the Rome Convention. See

PETER GROVES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND

THE INTERNAL MARKET OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 93 (1993).
9. Article 36 reads in pertinent part that "the provisions of Article 30 to 34 shall not
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that the Member States still determine the rules and conditions for
intellectual property protection while the Community's intellectual
property law is "characterized by a lack of harmonization or approximation." 10
Despite the Member States' international activity, the Community
has pursued international intellectual property matters since the mid1980s, including the negotiations on trade-related aspects of intellectual
property rights (TRIPs) in the recently concluded Uruguay Round of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Although the EC
initially was reluctant to endorse the GATT approach to intellectual
property protection, the Community has emerged as a "major
demandeur, perhaps stimulated by the ambitious submissions from the
private sector and other participants."". In a significant development for
its trading partners, the EC also has begun to retaliate against nations
that do not protect Community producers' intellectual property and has
required recognition as wellas acceptance of intellectual property standards in its trade treaties. 12 Furthermore, the EC makes tariff preferences

preclude prohibition or restrictions on imports, exports or goods in transit justified on grounds
of .. . the protection of industrial or commercial property. Such prohibitions shall not,
however, constitute a.means of arbitrary or disguised restriction on trade between Member
States." EEC TREATY art. 36; see V6LKER, supra note 6, at 198, 210 ("The regulation of
industrial and commercial property rights in the Community is still largely a competence of
the individual Member States.").
10. Case 144/81, Keurkoop v. Nancy Kean Gifts, 1982 E.C.R. 2853, 2871.
11. Thomas Cottier, The Prospectsfor Intellectual Property in GATT, 28 COMMON MKT.
L. REV. 383, 388-89 (1991). Indeed, the Community's draft proposals on TRIPs submitted to
the GATT in March 1990 were considered a "landmark." Id. at 387; see Draft Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/NGI 1/W/68
(29 Mar. 1990); see also Frank Emmert, Intellectual Property in the Uruguay
Round-Negotiating Strategies of the Western Industrialized Countries, 11 MICH. J.INT'L L.
1317, 1337-44; Working Programme of the Commission in the Field of Copyright and
Neighboring Rights: Follow-up to the Green Paper, COM(90)584 final at 21-31 [hereinafter
Commission Copyright Paper].
12. Regarding retaliation, see Commission Notice of an 'Illicit Commercial Practice'
Procedure Concerning the Unauthorized Reproduction of Sound Recordings in Indonesia,
1987 O.J. (C 136) 3 [hereinafter Indonesia Proceeding]; Council Regulation 4257/88 Applying
Generalized Tariff Preferences for 1989 in Respect of Certain Industrial Products Originating
in Developing Countries, 1988 O.J. (L 375) 1; and Commission Notice of an Examination
Procedure Concerning an Illicit Commercial Practice, within the Meaning of Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2641/84, Consisting of Piracy of Community Sound Recordings in Thailand,
1991 O.J. (C 189) 26 [hereinafter Thailand Proceeding]. The EC has assumed the power to
retaliate against unfair acts abroad under the "new Commercial Policy" instrument. Council
Regulation 2641/84 of 17 September 1984 on the Strengthening of the Common Commercial
Policy with Regard to Protection Against Illicit Commercial Practices, 1984 O.J. (L 252) 1.
Regarding trade agreements, see Agreement between the European Economic Community and
the European Atomic Energy Community and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on
Trade and Commercial and Economic Cooperation, art. 19, 1990 O.J. (L 68) 3, 7; Europe
Agreement Establishing an Association between the European Communities and their Member
States and the Republic of Hungary, arts. 65, 68 & Annex XIII, 1993 O.J. (L 347) 2 [herein-
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contingent upon adequate intellectual property rights for its goods. 3 In
January 1991, the Commission proposed a Council Decision that all
Member States that had not done so accede to the Berne and Rome
Conventions. It flatly declared, "the subject matter of the Berne Convention ...

and the Rome Convention falls within the competence of the

Community."'' 4 The Council did enact a resolution on May 14, 1992, but
did not adopt the broad language or claims of the Commission. 5 All
these actions imply exclusive Community competence, yet no Member
State has either changed its behavior regarding intellectual property
matters or objected to the behavior of other Member States.
Naturally, the immediate reaction to this is: "something is wrong."
This response, however, neither appreciates the significance of Timmermans' observation nor accounts for Community experience. As one
commentator remarked in reviewing the Court of Justice's jurisprudence
regarding the Community's external competence, "[o]ne inescapable
conclusion is that with a single-minded purpose, the Court has gradually
enlarged the scope of the Community's external competence and has
correspondingly diminished that of the Member States. Moreover, it is
reasonable to expect that this trend will continue."' 6 The trend will
likely continue in light of the extensive EC activity regarding intellectual property and the chaos that would result if deprived of this
authority. Accordingly, the more correct reaction would be: "something

after Hungary Europe Agreement]; and Commission Copyright Paper, supra note 11, at 27.
13. Council Regulation 4257/88, 1988 O.J. (L 375) 1, 3 (suspending Korea from

generalized tariff preferences for not providing EC goods the same protection as offered to
other trading partners).

14. Proposal for a Council Decision concerning the Accession of the Member States to
the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, as revised by the
Paris Act of 24 July 1971, and the International Convention for the.rotection of Performers,

Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organisations (Rome Convention) of 26 October
1961, COM(90)582 final at 12 [hereinafter Commission Proposal on the Berne and Rome
Conventions].
15. Council Resolution of 14 May 1992 on Increased Protection for Copyright and
Neighboring Rights, 1992 O.J. (C 138) 1. The Council, without referring to any legal foundation, merely stated that the conventions enjoy increased international acceptance, and given
the problems of piracy (of protected works), the Member States should join. Nonetheless, this

resolution also implicitly assumed the Commission's competence to negotiate copyright
agreements with third countries and to ensure third country compliance with the agreements
by inviting

the Commission, when negotiating agreements between the Community and third
countries, to pay particular attention, within the terms of the mandates given to
them for the purpose, to ratification of [the aforementioned conventions] by the
third countries concerned, or to the accession of the latter thereto, and to the
effective compliance of such countries with these instruments.
Id.
16. Burrows, supra note 2, at 118.
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is not yet right."
This does not mean that the Member States will be non plus about
the legal foundation, which could have enormous implications for their
sovereignty. Arguably, the Community has progressed thus far regarding
intellectual property because its actions had no obvious direct effect
upon Member State power despite the theoretical implications. In other
words, the Member States simply did not consider the consequences.
The deliberations on the legal basis for the Council Decision regarding
the Member States' accession to the Berne and Rome Conventions,
however, indicate the member States have begun to do so.1 7 Because
every expansion of Community external power means a decrease in
Member State authority, 8 the Member States will be careful not to
endorse a legal basis which surrenders too much power. The larger
Member States especially will resist relinquishing too many powers
because they fear that the Community's policy would be flawed or
unenforceable and that the Member States's external identity would be
compromised.' 9 According to one commentator, "Member States are
only impressed by a prioriexclusive Community powers. 20 Finally, the
issue of whether the Community, as an international entity, or the
Member States individually have competence regarding intellectual
property issues (or other trade issues, for that matter) has consequences
for their respective international obligations, particularly within the GATT.2'

17. See, e.g., Commission Proposal on the Berne and Rome Conventions, supra note 14;
see also Govaere, supra note 7, at 118.
18. This means a decrease in authority "in the sense that Member States are no longer
entitled to take on their own any measure in this field." Jacques H.J. Bourgeois, Some
Comments on the Practice,in DIVISION OF POWERS, supra note 1, at 97, 98.
19. Jacques H.J. Bourgeois, The Common Commercial Policy-Scope and Nature of the
Powers, in PROTECTIONISM AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 1, 4 (E.L.M. Volker ed., 2d ed.
1987) [hereinafter PROTECTIONISM].
20. C.D. Ehlermann, The Scope of Article 113 of the EEC Treaty, in tTUDES DE DROIT
DES COMMUNAUTtS EUROPtENNES 145, 146 (1984).
21. For example, if the EC does not have competence regarding international intellectual
property obligations and the Member States do, then, arguably, the GATT Article XXIV
exemption regarding customs unions does not apply and whatever Community relationship the
Member States have created regarding intellectual property among themselves may be subject
to the national treatment and most favored nations clauses of the GATT. In short, other
contracting parties may maintain that they deserve the same benefits as offered to the Member
States., Steenbergen addressed this issue when analyzing the Standards code as adopted in the
Tokyo Round of the GATT negotiations. He stated:
[T]he Agreement on technical barriers to trade is signed jointly by the Community
and the Member States, which makes it very difficult to know whether the Community is to be considered as a single market or party for the purpose of the
application of the Agreement, or whether each of the ten Member States are
individually bound by the agreement in the same way as each of the other parties.
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Ultimately, the Community must square Member State prerogatives
under Article 36 with external Community competence in the same
arena; theory must catch up with circumstance. Resolving this question
requires examining intellectual property within the Community and the
international arena as well as examining the basis for EC external power. In short, one must determine what relation Article 36 has to external
Community competence either based on the common commercial
policy22 or derived from other powers.
The Treaty offers no guidance in determining the relation of Article
36 to external Community competence, 3 and while secondary Community law and the Court's case law provide some clues about the
external effect of Article 36 derogations, they are inconclusive.24 Consequently, this inquiry identifies both the ill-defined division of powers
between the Member States and the Community and the limitations of
the theories of EC external competence. This does not suggest that there
are no justifications for extending EC power; rather, among them is
sheer practicality.25 Still, until the Court and Council decide on the
appropriate foundation, they remain only arguments. Nonetheless, the
Community's progression thus far without a clear legal foundation
reveals much about the dynamics of exercising external competence:
namely, that it grows less from design and more from opportunity and
need. The growth of external competence through need has been possible because the scope of EC's external power has defied precise
definition. The EC's actions with respect to intellectual property, however, may force the Community to better define the scope of its powers vis
ii vis the Member States. All things considered, the EC probably would
have preferred to avoid this situation.
In any event, the current situation cannot endure. The Court of
Justice has held that Community acts must include:
a statement of the facts and law [that] led the institution in question to adopt [the acts], so as to make possible review by the Court

Because the Member States also signed the Agreement individually ... it is more
difficult to justify a difference between rules applicable to intracommunity trade
and rules applicable to trade with other parties to the GATT Agreement.
J. Steenbergen, Trade Regulation Since the Tokyo Round, in PROTECTIONISM, supra note 19,

at 185, 188-89.
22. EEC TREATY arts. 110-16.

23. See VOLKER, supra note 6, at 131; cf Ehlermann, supra note 20, at 147 (discussing
scope of Article 113); Bourgeois, supra note 19, at 3-4 (discussing scope of Article 113).
24. See V6LKER, supra note 6, at 96, 102.
25. After all, the alternative is an EC hindered in its ability to protect Community
intellectual property concerns abroad.
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and so that Member States and the nationals concerned may have
knowledge of the conditions under which the Community institutions have applied the Treaty.
It must be observed that in the context of the organization of
the powers of the Community, the choice of the legal basis for a
measure may not depend simply on an institution's conviction as to
the objective pursued but must be based on objective factors [that]
are amenable to judicial review.26
Beyond this, the Community's trading partners will want to know
whether the EC or its Member States possesses the power to negotiate
and enforce agreements.27
As intellectual property's international trade implications continue to
grow, if the Community claims to represent European economic interests
abroad it will need authority over intellectual property issues and therefore must find a legal justification. The present difficulty stems from
events outrunning theory. The EC will play catch-up; the only question
is how much this route will strain credulity.

26. Case 45/86, Commission v. Council, 1987 E.C.R. 1493, 1519-20. The Court has
consistently held that
[t]he question whether the conclusion of a given agreement is within the power of
the Community and. whether, in a given case, such power has been exercised in
conformity with the provisions of the Treaty is, in principle, a question which may
be submitted to the Court of Justice, either directly, under Article 169 or Article
173 of the Treaty, or in accordance with the preliminary procedure of Article 228.
Opinion 1/75, Opinion of the Court Given Pursuant to Article 228 of the EEC Treaty, 1975
E.C.R. 1355, 1361. Under Article 228 of the Treaty, the Council, the Commission, or a
Member State may obtain beforehand the opinion of the Court "as to whether an agreement
envisaged is compatible with the provisions of this Treaty." EEC TREATY art. 228. Furthermore, Community measures based upon the inappropriate legal foundation contravene Article
190 and may be found void. Article 190 reads in part, "[riegulations, directives and decisions
of the Council and of the Commission shall state the reasons on which they are based." EEC
TREATY art. 190. In order for the Community to exercise its external relations power, commentators generally believe that a more specific authority is needed. Ami Barav, The Division
of External Relations Power between the European Economic Community and the Member
States in the Case-Law of the Court of Justice, in DiVISION OF POWERS, supra note 1,at 29,

33.
27. See Burrows, supra note 2, at 115.
There is already a discernible tendency in multilateral relations for others to ask for
a detailed explanation of the items for which the Community is responsible and
those for which the Member States must answer. This is not altogether unreasonable. [Third countries] wish to know who will be obliged to carry out each of the
provisions of the proposed Treaty, and they can perhaps be forgiven for wanting to
have these matters recorded as part of the travaux prdparatoires, rather than wait for
internal Community squabbles to be settled by the Court.
ld; see also Marc Maresceau, The Concept "Common Commercial Policy" and the Difficult
Road to Maastricht, in THE LEGAL DIMENSION, supra note 7, at 3, 19.
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INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE COMMUNITY'S
EXTERNAL COMPETENCE

The EC has two sources of external power: explicit provisions2" and
implied powers. Of the three explicit provisions only Article 113 could
possibly provide a basis for external competence in intellectual property
because the other two, Articles, 111 and 238, cover tariffs and association agreements.29 The implied external powers, on the other hand, flow
from the internal powers that are necessary for reaching specific Treaty
or legislative goals. Unlike explicit powers, defived competencies are
not necessarily exclusive. 30 Consequently, neither source possesses a
well-defined, all-inclusive scope that gives EC external competence its
essential evolutionary and adaptable character. 3' Bearing this in mind,
one cannot a priori exclude international intellectual property issues
from the Community's competence. Determining whether either source
can reach intellectual property depends, however, upon different considerations.
A. Article 113 and the Common Commercial Policy
The Community has exclusive competence over the scope of the
common commercial policy, but determining the extent of that scope
presents another issue. In its first opinion applying Article 113, the
Court of Justice held that the Treaty conceived of the cOmmon commercial policy through a Common Market that defends the common interests of the Community, which would be impaired by any concurrent
Member State power.32 Moreover, the Court declared that it would be
impossible for Member States to excercise concurrent powers in this
matter under Articles 113 and 114 . In .light of Article 36 and Member

28. EEC TREATY arts. 111, 113, 238.
29. Article IIl essentially outlined the provisions governing the Community and the
Member States regarding external commercial relations during the transitional period. EEC
TREATY art. I 1. Article 238 deals with the establishment of association agreements between
the Community and the third states, a union of states, or an international organization. EEC
TREATY art. 238.
30. E.L.M. V61ker, Annotation, Case 174/84, Bulk Oil (Zug) A.G. v. Sun International
Limited and Sun Oil Trading Company, 24 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 99, 106 (1987) ("Implicit
or implied powers become exclusive ... whenever the internal power of the Community
becomes exclusive .... ) (emphasis deleted) (discussing ERTA).
31. See, e.g., Opinion 1/78, Opinion of the Court Given Pursuant to the Second Subparagraph of Article 228(1) of the EEC Treaty, 1979 E.C.R. 2871 [hereinafter Natural
Rubber]; see also Timmermans, supra note I.
32. Opinion 1/75, 1975 E.C.R. at 1363-64.
33. Id. at 1364.
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State actions regarding intellectual property, however, this explicit
exclusivity poses conceptual problems for basing EC action on Article
113. Nevertheless, the Community has based its international intellectual
property initiatives on this article. The choice is understandable, given
Article 113's inherent and mandated adaptability to changing international trading conditions, and perhaps defensible, given the proper
theoretical approach and facts. Ultimately, Member State and EC competence could be differentiated so as to constitute distinct competencies,
or, without this differentiation, Member State activity will occur pursuant to a derogation of Community power.34 To support either approach
one must examine intellectual property regulation within the Community. After all, "the internal market programme has served as an
the scope and content of the
amplifier of the question of determining
3
common commercial policy. 1
1. Article 113's Inherent Adaptability to New
Concepts of Commercial Policy
Article 113 has been called one of "the most poorly drafted parts of
the ... Treaty. 36 It contains procedural requirements for the conclusion
of trade agreements and then merely stipulates that uniform principles
must support the common commercial policy. 37 The Article reads in
part:
After the transitional period has ended, the common commercial
policy shall be based on uniform principles, particularly in regard
to changes in tariff rates, the conclusion of tariff and trade agreements, the achievement of uniformity in measures of liberalization,
export policy and measures to protect trade such as those to be taken in case of dumping or subsidies.3 8

34. Essentially stated, in Case 41/76, Donckerwolcke v. Procureur de la Rdpublique,
1976 E.C.R. 1921 [hereinafter Donckerwolcke], the Court held that derogations from exclusive competence of the common commercial policy "are only permissible after the end of
the transitional period by virtue of specific authorization by the Community." Id. at 1937.
35. Piet Eeckhout, The External Dimension of the Internal Market a'nd the Scope of a
Modern Commercial Policy, in THE LEGAL DIMENSION, supra note 7, at 79, 83.

36. Ehlermann, supra note 20, at 147; see also Bourgeois, supra note 19, at 3 ("The
EEC Treaty is rather poorly drafted with respect to commercial policy.").
37. VOLKER, supra note 6, at 131. "This requirement is followed by a non-exhaustive
enumeration of trade policy instruments, including customs duties and quantitative restrictions." Id.
38. EEC TREATY art. 113. Significantly, subsection 4 of Article 113 declares that "in
exercising the powers conferred upon it by this Article, the Council shall act by a qualified
majority." Id. The possibility that a majority may outvote a Member State's interest must
contribute to the Member States' reluctance to surrender external power to the Community.
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This open-ended, non-exhaustive description permits Article 113 to
adapt to changing international trading conditions. The Court of Justice
explained that
[a] commercial policy is in fact made up by the combination and
interaction of internal and external measures, without priority being
taken by one over the others. Sometimes agreements are concluded
in execution of a policy fixed in advance, sometimes that policy is
defined by the agreements themselves ....

[It] is above all the

outcome of a progressive development ....
Moreover:
The common commercial policy is above all the outcome of a progressive development based upon specific measures [that] may
refer without distinction to "autonomous" and external aspects of
that policy and [that] do not necessarily presuppose, by the fact
that they are linked to the field of the common commercial policy,
the existence of a large body of rules, but combine gradually to
form that body.41
Accordingly, internal legislation is not necessary before concluding a
treaty.4'
A static concept of commercial policy would be destined to become
nugatory in the course of time. As the Court of Justice observed, new
practices and instruments of international trade continue to develop
alongside traditional ideas.42 If Article 113 could not extend to these
new concepts and practices, the Community would find itself unable to
deal with a changing international commercial environment. A restrictive
interpretation of the common commercial policy would ultimately lead

39. Opinion 1/75, 1975 E.C.R. at 1363. Prior to Opinion 1/75, the Court laid the

foundation for an expansive reading of the Community's external powers in Case 8/73,
Hauptzollamt Bremen v. Massey-Ferguson, 1973 E.C.R. 897, which stated that

the proper functioning of the customs union justifies a wide interpretation of
Articles 9, 27, 28, 111 and 113 of the Treaty and of the powers which these pro-

visions confer on the institutions to allow them thoroughly to control external trade
by measures taken both independently and by agreement.

Id. at 908. Kapteyn and VerLoren van Themaat explained that the founders wanted a commercial policy which was a "dynamic one, not ... static ... written in stone in 1957."
KAPTEYN & VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT, supra note 6, at 791.
40. Opinion 1/75, 1975 E.C.R. at 1363.
41. Barav, supra note 26, at 35; see Burrows, supra note 2, at 112-13 (stating that
"[tihis was not altogether surprising, since [Article 113] expressly conferred an external competence on the Community and made no suggestion that its exercise was in any way dependent upon the prior existence of internal rules, made under Article 112").
42. Natural Rubber, 1979 E.C.R. at 2873.
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to disruptions in intra-Community trade because Member States would
pursue their own trade policies to adjust to the new international conditions. For these reasons, the Court of Justice has interpreted Article 113
as "a non-exhaustive enumeration which must not, as such, close the
door to the application in a Community context of any other process
' Determining what
intended to regulate external trade."43
constitutes a
commercial policy measure "must be governed from a wide point of
view.""
The Court of Justice has stated that the Community's commercial
policy should not be more limited than any of the Member States' 45 thus
enabling it to include "a new concept of international trade relations. 46
In Case 45/86, the Court of Justice extended Article 113 to general tariff
preferences because they represented a new and growing method of
promoting international trade and economic development even though
such instruments contained major development aims beyond classic
commercial policy. The Court also declared that beyond practicality and
realism, the Treaty itself prompts such an approach. The Court held that
[i]n defining the characteristics and the instruments of the common
commercial policy in Article 110 . . . . the Treaty took possible
changes into account. Accordingly, Article 110 lists among the
objectives of commercial policy the aim of contributing 'to the
harmonious development of world trade,' which presupposes that
commercial policy will be adjusted in order to take account of any
changes of outlook in international relations. Likewise, Articles

43. Id.

44. Id. The Natural Rubber decision legitimized the Community's sole participation (that
is, without the Member States) in all but two of the Tokyo Round Code negotiations. J.H.J.
Bourgeois, The Tokyo Round Agreements on Technical Barriersand on Government Procurement in Internationaland EEC Perspective, 19 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 5, 21 (1982). Accord-

ing to Bourgeois, the two exceptions, the standards and the aircraft codes, are
difficult to justify on legal grounds.
it approved all the agreements by a
these two Codes come within the
been concluded by the Community
clusive.

As it was rightly decided by the Council when
Decision under Article 113 of the EEC Treaty,
scope of this provision; they could only have
acting alone since the power under 113 is ex-

Id. at 22; see also Ehlermann, supra note 20, at 151.
45. The concept of commercial policy has "the same content whether it is applied in the
context of an international action of a State or to that of the Community." Opinion 1/75, 1975

E.C.R. at 1362. While this statement does little to explain what exactly a commercial policy
entails, by linking the idea of commercial policy to prevailing state practices, the Court

ensured that the Community's commercial policy would not be ham-strung by definitional
limits. "[lindeed, any other approach would have flown in the face of reality and threatened
the ability of the Community as an international partner to cope with changes in international
trading relationships." KAPTEYN & VERLOREN
46. Case 45/86, 1987 E.C.R. at 1521. ,

VAN THEMAAT,

supra note 6, at 781.
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113 to 116 provide not only for measures to be adopted by the
institutions and for the conclusion of agreements with non-member
countries but also for common action 'within the framework of
international organizations of an economic character,' an expression which is sufficiently broad to encompass the international
organizations which might deal with commercial
problems from the
47
point of view of a development policy.

In addition to Article 113, the preamble and various other provisions
4
of the Treaty support applying a liberal approach to commercial policy.
A liberal approach, however, does not mean unlimited expansion; rather,
the Article's adaptability must be circumscribed by necessity. For example, in Opinion 1/75, the Court of Justice held that the "field of the
common commercial policy, and more particularly that of the export
policy, necessarily covers systems of aid for exports and more particularly measures concerning credits for the financing of local costs
linked to export operation. ''49 Accordingly, to implement the principles
embodied in the abovementioned provisions, the Community may
conclude the agreements at issue. 0
2. The New Concept: Intellectual Property Protection
as an International Trade Issue
The following subsections will show that intellectual property issues
have evolved from primarily national concerns to international trade
questions and that the Community, recognizing the trade implications of
intellectual property, has long acted to protect EC interests abroad.
a. The Internationalization of Intellectual Property Issues
The international trade dimension of intellectual property is a relatively recent phenomena that international organizations have been slow
to appreciate. 5' In spite of the TRIPS negotiations, GATT Article XX

47. Id. (emphasis added).
48. KAPTEYN & VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT, supra note 6, at 795.
49. Opinion 1/75, 1975 E.C.R. at 1362 (emphasis added).
50. Barav maintains that adaptation must be assessed in light of two considerations: 1)
"will an international treaty, if concluded by the Member States alone, necessarily interfere
with the exercise of the powers transferred to the Community by the Member States?" and 2)
"whether an international agreement, if adhered to by the Member States, could be effectively
applied on the Community's territory without the Community's participation." Barav, supra
note 26, at 40. Barav relied upon Natural Rubber, 1979 E.C.R. at 2902-08.
51. At the end of the Tokyo Round, in 1979, for example, the only proposal dealing with
this issue was the unsuccessful draft of the Anti-Counterfeit Code, relating to counterfeited
trademarks and copyright piracy, submitted by the United States and the EC. Draft Agreement
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has permitted the contracting parties to derogate from the principle of
free trade to safeguard intellectual property interests.52 Thus, this intellectual property based exception to trade liberalization can be invoked
when entering agreements with third countries that are contracting
parties to GATT. 53 Even within free trade areas or customs unions, the
GATT does not prohibit trade restrictions between and among members
as long as the restrictions protect intellectual property rights.54 Before
the Uruguay Round negotiations ended, the GATT intellectual property
as other international conventions, were "minimal
provisions, as well
55
and permissive.,
Though varying in details, intellectual property laws, throughout the
world essentially seek to ensure that the creator is rewarded for his or
her inventiveness and to motivate further creativity. 6 These laws protect

on Measures to Discourage the Importation of Counterfeit Goods, GATT Doc. UJ4817 (July
31, 1979).
52. That article reads in pertinent part:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination ... or a
disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be
construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of
measures: ... (d) necessary to secure .. the protection of patents, trademarks and
copyrights ....

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, art. XX, 61
Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT]. Article IX:I to 5 of the GATT deals with
labeling requirements (which differs from trademarks) while Article IX:6 concerns methods to
prevent misrepresentation regarding geographical origin.
53. Govaere, supra note 7, at 212.
54. GATT, art. XXIV(8); see VOLKER, supra note 6, at 108 n.99.
55. Cottier, supra note 11, at 394 n.35. Cottier explained that the nature of intellectual
property rights is inherently different from other trade issues.
Rights and obligations of the existing GATT are primarily related to goods. Rules
are applied with respect to the origin of a particular widget, independently of the
nationality or origin of an actual holder of rights vested in such goods. Persons and
intellectual property rights are, in other words, merely protected indirectly by way
of reflection. The subject of protection is basically different in intellectual property:
rights and protection are basically attached to right holders, not the product or
service which they trade. From a conceptual perspective, the difference is significant.
Id. at 394.
56. GILLIAN

DAVIES & HANS HUGO VON RAUSHER AUF WEEG, CHALLENGES TO COPYRIGHTS AND RELATED RIGHTS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 12-13 (1983). Article 2(1) of

the Paris Act of the Berne Convention protects all literary and artistic works which it defines
as including:
every production in the literary, scientific and artistic domain, whatever may be the
mode or form of its expression, such as books, pamphlets and other writings;
lectures, addresses, sermons and other works of the same nature; dramatic or
dramatic-musical works; ...musical compositions with or without words; cinematographic works to which are assimilated works expressed by a process analogous to
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the creator from rival enterprises and competitors pirating the creator's
process or idea. 7 Since the creation of the GATT, however, intellectual
property has undergone a fundamental conceptual change: the emphasis
has moved away from sovereign matters - e.g., one of protective
norms restricted to the territory of the state - to issues of adequate
protection of intellectual property rights abroad. As the economic importance of exports has increased, so have the needs for improved extraterritorial protection of intellectual property rights. This is particularly
true for inventors and producers of technological goods who, having
spent great sums in research and development, demand that their national governments protect their investments from pirating and the subsequent undermining of their competitive positions. "As such, it was no
longer the existence but rather the absence of, or deficiencies in, intellectual property protection which became the central issue in the
While strong intellectual property
international trade debate ...
rights were once believed to create possible trade barriers, today the
international exchange of goods is threatened by insufficient or nonexistent intellectual property rights.59
The international dimension of intellectual property is not altogether
new, however. The Berne Convention on Copyright protection has existed for over one hundred years 6° and similar treaties have been adopted, including the Universal Copyright Convention and the Rome
Phonograms Conventions.61 In addition, organizations such as WIPO
predate the Uruguay Round. These treaties, conventions, and organizations largely provide permissive regulatory protection based upon the
reciprocity of national treatment. What is new, however, is the awareness of the effect that intellectual property protection may have on
international trade and an active desire to protect these rights abroad. It

cinematography; works of drawing, painting, architecture, sculpture, engraving and
lithography; photographic works to which are assimilated works expressed by a
process analogous to photography; works of applied art; illustrations, maps, plans,
sketches and three-dimensional works relative to geography, topography, architecture or science.
Berne Convention, supra note 8, art. 2(1).
57.

W.R. CORNISH, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PATENTS, COPYRIGHT, TRADE MARKS AND

ALLIED RIGHTS 18 (2d ed. 1989).

58. Govaere, supra note 7, at 205-06.
59. Ulrich Joos & Rainer Moufang, Report on the Second Ringberg Symposium, in

GATT OR WIPO?: NEW WAYS IN THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY 31 (Friedrich-Karl Beier & Gerhard Schricker eds., 1989) (IIC Studies: Studies in
Industrial Property and Copyright Law Vol. 11) [hereinafter GATT OR WIPO]; see also
Commission Copyright Paper, supra note 11, at 21-31.
60. Berne Convention, supra note 8.
61. Rome Convention, supra note 8.

Michigan Journal of InternationalLaw

[Vol. 16:187

has been discovered that the absence of adequate protection of intellectual property or the existence of excessive protection can undermine the benefits derived from the elimination of high tariffs and the
reduction of non-tariff barriers.62
The growing interdependence of national economies in the increasing globalization and regionalization of markets has revealed insufficiencies in the present international regulatory framework.63 Many
current market factors combine to demonstrate a growing need for effective transnationalprotection of intellectual property rights. As indicated
above, intellectual creation and know-how increasingly comprise the
value of products and services as well as represent a substantial cost in
research and development. Given the relative ease that modem technology permits intellectual creation or know-how to be copied, inadequate
international intellectual property safeguards hinder investment recoupment and inhibit further research and development. Furthermore, without
intellectual property protection, the producer or supplier of services will
find itself at a disadvantage in the highly competitive foreign market.
This situation is exacerbated considering the trend toward research and
development in one country and licensed development in another. One
commentator noted that "[tihe present state of law in international
intellectual property protection increasingly impairs or even nullifies acquired benefits accruing under the [GATT]. ' '64
In its Green Paper on copyrights and neighboring rights, the Com-

62. Cottier, supra note 11,at 383.
63. See generally Id.; Frederick M. Abbott, Protecting First World Assets in the Third
World: Intellectual Property Negotiations in the GA7T Multilateral Framework, 22 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 689 (1989); Emmert, supra note 11.

64. Cottier, supra note 11,at 384; see also Council Resolution of 14 May 1992, supra
note 15. It must be pointed out, however, that granting worldwide intellectual property protection does not improve trade in technology-based goods.
The territoriality principle combined with the exclusive character of the right has as
a consequence that the home market, will continue to be protected against parallel
imports. Real trade liberalization of technology-based products could only be
obtained through the abolishment of the reference to intellectual property protection
in Article XX(d) GAT, or through the insertion of an explicit reference to the
exhaustion of rights in case of parallel protection. The current TRIPS negotiations,
which to a great extent focus on standards and norms of protection, will, however,
lead to a partial trade liberalization in the sense that new export markets will be
created and secured against counterfeiting and piracy. In other words, a successful
conclusion of the TRIPS negotiations will increase the transfer of technology and
the export of technology-based goods, but (re-) importation into the home market
of technology-based goods will still be restricted .... In this sense, the adoption of
higher standards of intellectual property protection worldwide will essentially
benefit and increase the trade performance of those countries which have a technology worth protecting.
Govaere, supra note 7, at 205-06; see also GROVES

ET AL.,

supra note 8, at 1.
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mission observed that new technologies during the last ten years have
created the need for a "global approach" to intellectual property (in this
case, copyrights). The Commission cited three main developments: 1)
copyrights and neighboring rights in western economies play an increased role; 2) the use made of goods and services with links with
copyright has undergone profound changes; and 3) questions of copyright and neighboring rights have become international as the new
technologies have blurred national borders thus making purely domestic
protection inadequate. 65 Because the new uses of copyright and neighboring rights are often practiced on an international scale, the Community must recognize this new dimension and take a multilateral
approach to intellectual property.6
The international trade realities explained above have compelled the
Community to act to secure its intellectual property rights abroad. This
new development in international trade is the sort to which the Court of
Justice intended Article 113 to adapt. 67 As some commentators have
noted with respect to the international provision of services:
If negotiations in the GATT take place on matters such as the
international provision of services and international establishment
in an international trade organisation such as the GATT and such
matters become a permanent concern of the GATT then it is not
conceivable that the concept of a common commercial policy
would not also embrace these subjects in the long run.68
Similarly, it is inconceivable that the common commercial policy would
not also embrace intellectual property.
b. The New International Trade Concept at Work in the Community
Without apparent question about the legal foundation, the Commission has maintained that protecting EC producer intellectual property

65. Commission Copyright Paper, supra note 11, at 2.
66. Id. at 4 ("a response to the challenges of new technology which is limited to the
Member States of the Community will deal with only part of the problem").
67. Concern for intellectual property protection comes not only from the industrialized
world but also from the developing world whose infant industries have benefitted from the
"largely permissive international regulatory network." Cottier, supra note 11, at 384. Indeed,

increased protection of intellectual property may impede development through additional
administrative burdens, further dependence on foreign investment, as well as continued economic transfers to the industrialized world. See generally CHAKRAVARTHI RAGHAVEN, RECOLONIZATION: GATT, THE URUGUAY ROUND & THE THIRD WORLD 114-41 (1990); Harms
Ullrich, GATT: Industrial Property Protection, Fair Trade and Development, in GATT OR

WIPO, supra note 59, at 127.
68. KAPTEYN & VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT, supra note 6, at 781.
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rights internationally falls within the scope of Article 113. At least three
actions have been initiated under the new commercial policy instrument
to defend against "illicit trade practices" involving international intellectual property issues. 69 In 1987, for example, the Community brought an
action against the United States for excluding imports of certain aramid
fibers manufactured by the Dutch company AKZO NV (AKZO). 70 The
Community essentially attempted to change a third country's procedural
law by alleging a breach of an international convention relating to
intellectual property. Here, the Commission complained that the U.S.
procedure denying AKZO the right to counter-claim against E.I. Dupont
de Nemours' (Dupont) patent violation claim constituted a denial of
national treatment within the meaning of Article III of the GATT and
did not come within the Article XIX(d) exception.7'
The EC also began proceedings against Indonesia and Thailand for
not protecting Community intellectual property rights. In March, 1987,
the Community alleged that Indonesia had failed to prevent unauthorized
sound recordings. The Commission argued that by failing to provide
adequate protection against unfair competition, Indonesia had infringed
Article 10 of the Paris Convention - even though Indonesia is not a
member.72 Moreover, the Commission maintained that Indonesia, by
requiring that EC products first be placed on the Indonesian market in
order to obtain copyright protection, violated the national treatment
principle of both the Berne Convention and the Universal Copyright
Convention. At least one commentator has argued that "[a]part from the
rather dubious contention that a state can be held to comply with a
convention it has not signed, the Community seems to consider the very
level of protection granted by Indonesian law ...an illicit commercial
73
practice."
In July, 1991, the Commission commenced a similar action against
Thailand, alleging a violation of the Berlin revision and the Paris Act of
the Berne Convention, for failing to prevent the piracy of Community
sound recordings.74 The Commission claimed that Thailand's inaction

69. See supra note 12.
70. Commission Decision 87/251 of 12 March 1987, 1987 O.J. (L 117) 18.
71. See M.C.E.J. Bronckers, The Potential and Limitations of the Community's New
Trade Policy Instrument, in TRADE LAWS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND THE UNITED
STATES IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 33, 140-41 (P. Demaret et al. eds., 1992).

72. See Indonesia Proceeding, supra note 12; see also Commission Decision of 23
November 1987 Suspending the Illicit Commercial Practices Procedure Concerning the Unauthorized Reproduction of Sound Recordings in Indonesia, 1987 O.J. (L 335) 22, 23.
73. Govaere, supra note 7, at 202.
74. See Thailand Proceeding, supra note 12.
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harmed the EC through reduced sales of legitimate Community products. Furthermore, the Commission claimed that Thailand, by failing to
prevent sales of pirated recordings to third countries, restrained Community access to those markets. By calculating the injury as a lost benefit,
the EC characterized international intellectual property protection as a
right rather than as a favor granted by foreign authorities. 75
The Community also has granted tariff preferences, a subject matter
exclusively under Article 113,76 contingent upon the adequate intellectual property protection for Community goods in the requesting
country. In 1988, the Community suspended the Republic of Korea from
the list of nations that benefit from the general system of tariff preferences in retaliation for discriminating against Community products and
in favor of American products through its industrial property protection.77 The Community declared that
[w]hereas the Republic of Korea does not treat the Community on
an equal footing with other trade partners and whereas it has taken
discriminatory measures in respect of the Community in the sphere
of the protection of intellectual property; whereas, therefore, it is
inappropriate that the Republic of Korea should benefit from the
scheme of generalized tariff preferences as long as this situation
continues. 78
In October 1991, after this suspension was terminated, however, the
Commission negotiated an agreement with South Korea that led to a
Council Decision giving the Commission a negotiating mandate to
conclude an agreement on matters of mutual interests, including intellectual property. 79
In the Community's recent bilateral trade agreements, the EC has
attempted to increase levels of intellectual property protection by including clauses that not only direct third countries to comply with their
international obligations, but also attempt to raise the level of intellectual property protection for Community products abroad. Exemplifying
this trend, the Community recently concluded agreements with Poland,
Hungary, and the Czech Republic where these countries agreed to approximate the .level of intellectual property protection existing in the

75. Govaere, supra note 7, at 202.

76. See Case 45/86, 1987 E.C.R. at 1493.
77. See Council Regulation 4257/88, supra note 12, at 3.
78. Id.

79. See BULL. EC to-1991, point 1.2.38. For termination of the suspension, see Council
Regulation 282/92, 1992 O.J. (L 31) 1.
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Community and to accede to intellectual property conventions.'s
Regarding multinational negotiations such as the GATT, the EC has
taken an active role, which the Commission characterized as "a leading
force in its commitment to the highest possible level of intellectual
property protection."'" Also, the Commission "strongly believes that the
82
agreement on TRIPs should become an integral part of the GATT.
Essentially, the TRIPs negotiations seek to establish universal intellectual property norms for providing protection and for enforcing
rights.8 3 The Commission emphasized in its proposed guidelines and
objectives that "the main objective of [TRIPs] .. .should be to elimi-

nate (or at least substantially reduce) the distortions and impediments to
international trade created by the inadequacies or excesses of substantive
standards."8'4 The Commission also maintained that the Community
assume a greater role in WIPO because WIPO's recent initiatives concerning standards for intellectual property rights and dispute resolution
"are of particular interest to the Community.5 Moreover, "[the] further
evolution of the Community's role within WIPO in general is a matter
of considerable importance given the likelihood of further Community
legislation on copyrights and ...

on other forms of intellectual proper-

ty."8 6
3. The Unclear Concept: the Intra-Community
Status of Intellectual Property
Despite the Commission's seemingly easy acceptance of intellectual
property as an international trade issue within its competence 87 it

80. See Inge Govaere, The Impact of Intellectual Property Protection on Technology
Transfer Between the EC and the Central and Eastern European Countries, J.WORLD TRADE,

Oct. 1991, at 57, 57-76; Hungary Europe Agreement, supra note 12, arts. 65 & 68 and
Annex XIII; see also Commission Copyright Paper, supra note 11, at 21-31. According to
Govaere, it "seems that this change in approach is to be situated around the year 1990."
Govaere, supra note 7, at 204.

81. Commission Copyright Paper, supra note 11, at 22.
82. Id.

83. See generally Cottier, supra note 11.
84. Guidelines and Objectives Proposed by the European Community for Negotiations on
the Trade Related Aspects of Substantive Standards of Intellectual Property Rights, GATT
Doc. MTN.GNG/NGI 1/W/26 (July 7, 1988), reprinted in GATT OR WIPO, supra note 59, at
325. Ironically, given its actions against Thailand and Indonesia, the Community proposed
that if trade-related intellectual property problems arise with other signatories, the parties
should refer to the dispute settlement mechanism provided by the Agreement rather than

result to bilateral or unilateral action. Commission Copyright Paper, supra note 11, at 22.
at 24-25.
85. Commission Copyright Paper, supra note 11,
86. Id. at 25.

87. See, e.g., Comission Proposal on the Berne and Rome Conventions, supra note 14.
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remains at heart a national concern, which Article 36 and GATT articles
XX and XXIV demonstrate. The Member State still creates intellectual
property laws and enforcement is restricted to the territory of the State.
Within the EC, however, one cannot say that the Community has no
power regarding intellectual property laws. On the contrary, the Community circumscribes the Member States' exercise of intellectual property rights when the integrity of the internal market is at issue. The secondary Community law possibly even suggests that the EC has power
over intellectual property. Ultimately, however, intellectual property's
status within the Community appears somewhat hazy. Fortunately, this
haze presents opportunities because uncertainty feeds flexibility.
a. Intellectual Property as a Measure of Equivalent Effect
The original drafters of the Treaty may not have considered the
potential problems posed by intellectual property because it is inherently
difficult to reconcile granting intellectual property rights, which may
divide markets, with creating a common market.88 Such intellectual
property rights do not promote free trade. One commentator has explained the dilemma and described these rights as
exclusive rights granted for the territory of the state where protection was brought. This implies that the holder can prohibit the
marketing of products [that] infringe his right, and in practice often
comes down to having a legal monopoly on the market concerned.
It is because of their exclusive character that intellectual property
rights have traditionally been regarded as barriers to trade.... ."
This is known as the "principle of territoriality," which means that the
legal protection granted within a state depends on the rules of that
state's laws. 9° Often, goods produced by one corporation, organization,
or association of enterprises can be blocked from crossing territories
through adopting the appropriate legal technique.9' It must be remembered that Article 36 is based upon Article XX of the GATT, which
permits a contracting party to derogate from the principle of free trade

88. GROVES ET AL., supra note 8, at 1-2; see also Cottier, supra note 11, at 384 ("In
terms of trade barriers, the global problem of varying national standards is not fundamentally
different from the situation within the European Economic Community .....

89. Govaere, supra note 7, at 199.
90. DAVIES & VON RAUSCHER AUF WEEG, supra note 56, at 51-52. For a general discussion on the principle of terata in the field of intellectual property, see Friedrich-Karl Beier, La
territorialit du droit des marque et les 6changes internationaux, 98 JOURNAL DU DROIT
INTERNATIONAL 5, 16-17 (1971).
91. CORNISH, supra note 57, at 18.
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to protect intellectual property concerns.92
Intellectual property rights are thus "measures of equivalent effect,"
which are "trading rules enacted by Member States [that] are capable of
hindering directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-Community
trade."93 Such measures violate Article 30's prohibitions94 if they do not
fall within one of the mandatory requirements exceptions developed by
the Court of Justice's case law95 or within one of the stated exceptions
in Article 36. Under Article 36, the Court of Justice has defined "industrial or commercial property" to include patents, utility models, plant
variety rights, industrial designs, trademarks, service marks, trade names,
geographic indications of source and appellations of origin, and
copyrights.96
Even though the Treaty permits derogations from Article 30 to
protect national intellectual property rights, the right to protect is circumscribed by the requirements of the internal market. Consistently, the
Court has interpreted Articles 30 and 36 "as meaning that the territorial
protection afforded by the national laws to industrial and commercial
property may not have the effect of legitimizing the insulation of national markets and of leading to an artificial partitioning of the markets." 97
Unlike other Article 36 interest balancing in terms of proportionality and
need,9" the Court of Justice examines the restrictions created by intellectual property rights in terms of existence versus exercise. The Court of
Justice has held that while the Treaty does not affect the existence of
commercial and industrial property rights, the Treaty may prohibit their

92. See Govaere, supra note 7, at 218-19.
93. Case 8/74, Procureur du Roi v. Benoit and Gustav Dassonville, 1974 E.C.R. 837, 852
[hereinafter Dassonville]; see also Joined Cases 55 & 57/80 Musik-Vertrieb Membran v.
GEMA, 1981 E.C.R. 147, 161; Giuliano Marenco & Karen Banks, Intellectual Property and
the Community Rules on Free Movement: Discrimination Unearthed, 15 EUR. L. REV. 224,
228 (1990).
94. Article 30 provides: "[q]uantitative restrictions on imports and all measures having
equivalent effect shall ... be prohibited between Member States." EEC TREATY art. 30.
95. See Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung fUr Branntwein,
1979 E.C.R. 649 [hereinafter Cassis de Dijon]. The Court of Justice has also held that intellectual property constitutes a mandatory requirement. See Case 62/79, Coditel v. S.A. Cin6
Vog Films, 1980 E.C.R. 881, 903-04.
96. See, e.g., Case 15/74, Centrafarm v. Sterling Drug, 1974 E.C.R. 1147 (patents); Case

10/89, SA CNL-Sucal NV v. HAG GF AG, 1990 E.C.R. 1-3711 (trademarks); Case 144/81,
1982 E.C.R. at 2853 (industrial design); Joined Cases 55 & 57/80, 1981 E.C.R. at 147
(copyrights).
97. Case 270/80, Polydor v. Harlequin Record Shops, 1982 E.C.R. 329, 348-49 [hereinafter Polydor]; see also Case 119/75, Terrapin (Overseas) Ltd. v. Terranova Industrie C. A.
Kapferer & Co., 1976 E.C.R. 1039.
98. See, e.g., Cassis de Dijon, 1979 E.C.R. at 649; Dassonville, 1974 E.C.R. at 837; cf.
Case 302/86, Commission v. Denmark, 1988 E.C.R. 4607 (discussing proportionality and
need in relation to environmental laws and Article 113).

Fall 1994]

Intellectual Property and External Power of the EC

209

exercise in the appropriate circumstances. The Court of Justice declared
that "Article 36 in fact only admits of derogations from the free movement of goods where such derogations are justified for the purpose of
safeguarding rights [that] constitute the specific subject matter of this
property." 99 In short, the Treaty does not object to Member States creating intellectual property rights, but Articles 30 or 34 may condemn the
exercise of those rights."°
Essentially, Member States can create intellectual property rights
provided that they are exercised in conformity with Community laws
and goals. Particularly, Member States cannot use industrial and commercial property rights to maintain or establish artificial partitions within
the Community or create disguised restrictions on trade between the
Member States. In this regard, the "exercise of industrial and commercial property rights conferred by national legislation must consequently
be restricted."' 0 ' Admittedly, the difference between existence and
exercise is blurry and does not resolve the tension between free movement of goods and the protection of intellectual property. 0 2 Moreover,
some commentators criticize this approach because the "definition of the
specific subject-matter of a given right has had to be modified with

every new case in order to fit the particular problem
under consideration
10 3
and to justify the solution to be given to it.'

99. Case 15/74, 1974 E.C.R. at 1162 (emphasis added); see also Case 16/74, Centrafarm
v. Winthrop BV, 1974 E.C.R. 1183, 1194; Case 19/84, Pharmon v. Hoechst, 1985 E.C.R.
2281, 2297-98; Case 187/80, Merck v. Stephar, 1981 E.C.R. 2063, 2080. See generally
PETER OLIVER, FREE MOVEMENT OF GOODS IN THE EEC 224-47 (2d ed. 1988); LAURENCE
W. GORMLEY, PROHIBITING RESTRICTIONS ON TRADE WITHIN THE EEC 184-210 (1985);
CHRISTOPHER BELLAMY & GRAHAM D. CHILD, COMMON MARKET LAW OF COMPETITION ch.
7 (3d ed. 1987); Corrina M. Wissels, European Community Law, in THE LAW OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY IN EUROPE 1992 3, 19-20 (A.P. Meijboom & C. Prins eds., 1991);
Georges Friden, Recent Developments in EEC Intellectual Property Law: The Distinction
Between Existence and Exercise Revisited, 26 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 192, 193-94 (1989).
100. OLIVER, supra note 99, at 225. By distinguishing between exercise and existence,

the Court has sought to reconcile Article 30-36 with Article 222 of the Treaty. Wissels, supra
note 99, at 20-21. Article 222 provides that the Treaty shall "in no way prejudice the rules in
Member States governing the system of property and ownership." EEC TREATY art. 222. Intellectual property rights also differ from other Article 36 provisions in that these are personal
rights, not the State's rights, whose enforcement depends on the holder.

101. Case 144/81, 1982 E.C.R. at 2872-73.
102. Friedrich-Karl Beier, Industrial Property and the, Free Movement of Goods in the
Internal European Market, 21 IIC 131, 147 (1990). Beier also states that "the proviso not
only refers to the statutory provisions and their application by government agencies and
courts, but also to private industrial property rights provided by these provisions and the
exercise of these rights, i.e., their enforcement by individuals." Id.
103. Marenco & Banks, supra note 93, at 230. They also observed that the Court of
Justice has "understandably hesitatcd to apply the specific subject-matter test beyond the
exhaustion cases." Id. For a discussion of "exhaustion," see infra notes 110-12 and accompanying text.
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In Polydor, the Court directed that the exercise of intellectual property law must be determined in the light of the Community's objectives
and activities as defined by Articles 2 and 3 of the Treaty. Namely,
establishing a common market, progressively approximating the economic policies of the Member States, and seeking to create a single
market with the characteristics of a domestic market. Accordingly, the
Court interpreted Article 30 and 36 to mean that the territorial protection
provided by national industrial and commercial property laws may not
legitimize the insulation of national markets and artificially partition the
markets.1°4 Thus, legitimate exercise, as defined by national law, ends
where threats to, or interference with, Community interests begin. Essentially, this means that each Member State may define the criteria for
intellectual property protection (i.e. trademark distinctiveness or the
novelty required for a patent) but the holder of the right cannot use the
national intellectual property laws to defeat the objectives of the single
market. Article 36 confers only limited protection of intellectual proper10 5
ty rights.
Although the specific subject matter criteria suggests the presence of
a Community standard regarding intellectual property rights, one does
not exist. The Court of Justice has never attempted to create an abstract
Community definition of the essence of industrial property protection.
Neither the Treaty nor secondary Community law provides a foundation
for such a definition. Furthermore, nothing in the aims and principles of
the Treaty, as described in the Preamble and in Articles 1 and 2, could
allow the Court of Justice to define with sufficient certainty the extent
of industrial property protection.1°6 The Court of Justice determines the
parameters of the specific subject matter, 0 7 and the Court has defined
them in only a few areas. 10 8

104. Polydor, 1982 E.C.R. at 348-49.
105. Friden, supra note 99, at 194. Oliver argues:
For instance, were a Member State to limit the protection afforded by an industrial
property right to products manufactured within its territory, that would surely be
unjustified. Again, it would presumably be unjustified for a Member State to
stipulate that a right may only be registered by a person with a place of business or
representation in its territory.
note 99, at 227-28.
106. Beier, supra note 102, at 148; see also Marenco & Banks, supra note 93, at 230.
107. See Friden, spra note 99, at 194.
108. Regarding patents, the Court has stated that it is "the guarantee that the patentee, to
reward the creative effort of the inventor, has the exclusive right to use an invention with a
view to manufacturing industrial products and putting them into circulation for the first time."
Case 15/74, 1974 E.C.R. at 1162. As for trade marks, the Court has held that its specific
subject matter consists of the
OLIVER, supra
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The bulk of cases involving intellectual property rights and Article
36 examine and apply the exhaustion principle.' 9 Essentially, the Court
of Justice has declared that specific subject matter does not include attempts by a Community intellectual property right holder to block
parallel imports of goods the holder or authorized agents placed into
commerce in another Member State. "l "Exhaustion" further emphasizes
the fundamental concern not to permit the artificial partitioning of the
internal Market which would disrupt the flow of goods. As a consequence, if a product has been lawfully marketed in another Member
State, the proprietor of an industrial or commercial property cannot rely
on its Member State's intellectual property law to prevent importing the
product."' Some commentators have criticized the Court of Justice's
exhaustion principle, assessing that the Court
values market unity over
2
Member State intellectual property laws."l
The Court of Justice does respect national intellectual property
rights, however, so long as they do not disrupt the internal market by
maintaining or establishing "artificial partitions." This is far different

guarantee that the owner of the trade mark has the exclusive right to use that trade
mark, for the purpose of putting products protected by the trade mark into circulation for the first time, and is therefore intended to protect him against competitors
wishing to take advantage of the status and reputation of the trade mark by selling
products illegally bearing that trade mark.
Case 16/74, 1974 E.C.R. at 1i94. Moreover, in Case 238/87, AB Volvo v. Erik Veng (UK)
Ltd., 1988 E.C.R. 6211, the Court stated that "the right of the proprietor of a protected design
to prevent third parties from manufacturing and selling or importing, without its consent,
products incorporating the design constitthes the very subject-matter of his exclusive right."
Id. at 6235.
109. Beier, supra note 102, at 151.
110. See Case 144/81, 1982 E.C.R. at 2853; Case 3/78, Centraform v. American Home
Products, 1978 E.C.R. 1823.
Ill. Polydor, 1982 E.C.R. at 349.
112. Oliver commented:
Some authors have criticised the Court's case law in the exhaustion of rights
principle, claiming that the real concern of the Court has been the free movement
of goods and that the Court has attached little importance to the protection of
industrial property rights. These authors maintain that in defining the specific
subject matter of the various industrial property rights the Court has failed to have
regard to the varying purposes of these rights in the different Member States.
OLIVER, supra note 99, at 247. Groves commented:
In the absence of harmonised intellectual property systems in the Community, the
Commission and the Court between them*have done a good job of adapting the
existing rules of the Treaty, of competition and of free movement, to minimise the
effects on interstate trade of differences in national"laws. Indeed, it is sometimes
argued that this process has obviated the need for harmonisation; but harmonisation
provides a more complete solution.
GRovES ET AL., supra note 8, at 15.
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from other Article 36 derogations where market impact is assumed and
then balanced against other interests. Essentially, although the EC does
not possess the power to create norms, it has ultimate authority to
decide whether those norms are exercised properly. Thus, while the EC
cannot decree, it can deny. In any event, the Member States exercise
their powers in the shadow of EC priorities.
b. Intellectual Property in Secondary EC Legislation
To add to the ambiguity about intellectual property's status within
the EC, the Community's import and export regulations and several
bilateral agreements contain clauses similar to Article 36."' For example, Article 21 of the General Import Regulation No. 288/82 reads in
part: "this Regulation shall not preclude the adoption or application by
Member States: (a) of prohibitions, quantitative restrictions or measures
of surveillance on grounds of public morality, public policy or public
security; the protection of health and life of humans ...

or the protec-

tion of industrial and commercial property."'" 4 This regulation can be
interpreted either as a specific authorization of national commercial
policy measures or as a declaration depending on how one defines the
115
scope of the commercial policy.
In sum, the Community's power regarding intellectual power remains an "open question." This in itself is important since theoretically
Community competence is not a priori denied. The case law suggests
that the Member States' intellectual property laws are less important
than the integrity of the internal market. This fundamental priority is
reflected in the common commercial policy's basic aim of avoiding
deflections of trade and distortions of competition within the com-

113. These include Council Regulation 288/82 on Common Rules for Imports, art. 21,
1982 O.J. (L 35) 1, and Commission Regulation 2603/69 on Common Rules for Community
Export, art. I1, 1969 O.J. (L 324) 25. See also Govaere, supra note 7, at 219; VOLKER, supra
note 6, at 63, 101; Bourgeois, supra note 19, at 10; Lauwaars, supra note 2, at 78-79.
114. Council Regulation 288/82, supra note 113, art. 21. For examples of bilateral trade

agreements, see Commission Regulation 1842/71, 1971 O.J. (L 192) 14, and Commission
Regulation 283/72, 1972 O.J. (L 300) 94. See also Agreements on the European Economic
Area, arts. 11, 12, 1994 O.J. (L 1)1; Hungary Europe Agreement, supra note 12, art. 35;
Europe Agreement Establishing an Association between the European Communities and their
Member States and the Republic of Poland, art. 35, 1993 O.J. (L 348) 2; Europe Agreement
Establishing an Association between the European Communities and their Member States and
the Czech Republic, Title III, signed Oct. 4, 1993 (unpublished).
115. Bourgeois, supra note 19, at 10. Similarly, Bronckers observed, "[t]he unresolved
issue is whether the Council's provision is declaratory (reflecting residual, independent
powers of the Member States) or whether it is to be interpreted as a Community authorization
of national commercial policy measures." M.C.E.J. Bronckers, A Legal Analysis of Protectionist Measures Affecting Japanese Imports into the European Community-Revisited, in
PROTECTIONISM, supra note 19, at 57, 74.
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mon/internal market by creating a uniform external regime." 6 Whether
Article 113 can extend to intellectual property depends upon how one
defines the scope of the common commercial policy - particularly in
relation to sanctioned measures of equivalent effect.
4. The Scope of Article 113

-

Adaptable, but How Far?

The following subsections will examine the various positions regarding the scope of Article 113 taken by the Commission and the Council,
the Court of Justice, and academics. As will become apparent, while
general consensus exists that Article 113 is adaptable, there is little
consensus about the extent of that adaptability.
a. The Commission and the Council
Despite the serious implications of Article 113's exclusivity, there is
still wide debate as to what acts constitute commercial policy measures
- especially between the Council and the Commission. According to
the Council, "the scope of Article 113 is limited to such action, whether
autonomous or resulting from agreement, which has the aim of altering
the volume or pattern of trade. In all other cases in which the aim is not
pursued or is pursued only in addition to one or more other aims, Article 113 is not applicable."' " 7 This view has been criticized because
determining the criteria whether a measure affects the pattern of trade
would be difficult to apply to autonomous commercial policy measures
that are inherent to conducting'any trade policy. For example, it is hard
to argue that customs formalities or rules of origin influence the volume
and flow of trade.11 8 Second, the Council's view has been criticized
because there is a subjective element of this approach that can be abused
by Member States claiming that they believe a measure's purpose takes
it beyond the scope of the EEC Treaty or places it under Treaty provision requiring unanimity.11 9
The Commission, on the other hand, has argued that "any measure
[that] is objectively appropriate for promoting the regulation of international trade, irrespective of any other aims it may have as well, falls
within the area of the common commercial policy.' 20 The Commis-

116.
117.
118.
119.

Eeckhout, supra note 35, at 94.
Case 45/86, 1987 E.C.R. at 1508.
Bourgeois, supra note 19, at 5.
Id.

120. Case 45/86, 1987 E.C.R. at 1508; see also Natural Rubber, 1979 E.C.R. at 2910-11;
Ehlermann, supra note 20, at 148; Bourgeois, supra note 19, at 5-6.

Michigan Journal of InternationalLaw

[Vol. 16:187

sion's view has been interpreted to adapt well to measures that are
applicable only to third countries or to measures that differentiate trade
with third countries from internal intra-Community trade. 21 This interpretation characterizes the nature of the Commission's interest in international intellectual property measures as confined to what other countries are doing. The Commission's view has been criticized, however,
because it lacks "a convincing criterion if ... faced with measures [that]
apply ... both to external and to internal trade."' 122 It also has been
criticized because the term "instrument" is simply "too broad." '23
b. The Court
The Court of Justice responded but did not resolve the dispute
between the Council and the Commission in the Natural Rubber opinion.124 After declaring that the EC may develop a commercial policy
designed to regulate the world market, 25 the Court held that whether an
agreement falls under the common commercial policy "must be assessed
having regard to its essential objective rather than in terms of individual
clauses of an altogether subsidiary or ancillary nature."'' 26 Moreover, the
effect an agreement has on certain sectors of economic policy do not
exclude such objectives from the common commercial policy. 27 The
agreement itself should indicate its essential objective through its
motivation, structure, instruments, and effects and through the
framework in which the agreement was reached. 28 Both the Council and
the Commission have relied upon the Natural Rubber opinion "to
1
defend their unchanged views." 29
Arguably, however, the Court of Justice in the Chernobyl case 3 ° not
only implicitly embraced the Commission's stance, but also seemingly
offered a distinction between external Community action and Member

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Ehlermann, supra note 20, at 152.
Id.
Bourgeois, supra note 19, at 5.
Natural Rubber, 1979 E.C.R. at 2871.
Id. at 2913.

126. Id. at 2917. For example, "technological assistance, research programmes, labour
conditions in the industry concerned, or consultations relating to national tax policies . . . may
have an effect on the price" of the product concerned. Id.
127. Id. at 2915. An example is the supply of raw material to the Community or price
policy. Id

128. Bourgeois, supra note 19, at 7; see also Ehlermann, supra note 20, at 156.
129. See, e.g., Bourgeois, supra note 19, at 5; see also Ehlermann, supra note 20, at 151
(stating that "both institutions have retreated into their traditional trenches").
130. Case C-62/88, Hellenic Republic v. Council, 1990 E.C.R. 1-1527 [hereinafter
Chernobyl].
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State action within the same field. In this decision, the Court held that
Regulation No. 3955/87, which restricted the importation of food contaminated by radiation from the Chernobyl accident, could use Article
113 as a basis despite this measure's essential objective of safeguarding
the health of Community consumers.' 3' Thus, commercial policy considerations were ancillary. The Court reasoned that
the preamble to [the] Regulation ...indicates that "the Community
must continue to ensure that agricultural products . . . intended for

human consumption and likely to be contaminated are introduced
into the Community only according to common arrangements" and
that those "common arrangements should safeguard the health of
consumers, [and] maintain, without having unduly adverse effects on
trade between the Community and third countries, the unified nature
132
of the market and prevent deflections of trade."'
Article 113 constituted sufficient legal basis and did not require any
additional basis such as Articles 130S-130T, because the Regulation's
stated objective and content - not its predominant purpose - "as they
appear from the very terms of the regulation ... [are] intended to regulate trade between the Community and non-member countries ... within

the meaning of Article 113."' 13 In short, even though the measure undeniably sought to protect health, because it was couched in the traditional terms of an international trading measure, it fell under Article
113, which is the result that commentators had foreseen. 134
More significantly, however, the Court of Justice's decision allows
Article 113 to apply to matters which relate to measures of equivalent

131. Id. at 1-1547-51.

132. Id. at 1-1549.
133. Id.
134.

According to the Council only measures which are meant to influence the volume
or pattern of trade with third countries fall within the common commercial policy.
Measures that would have as their primary objective the protection of health, of the
environment or of the consumer, fall under this interpretation of the Council,
outside the scope of Article 113....
On the other hand, the Commission's definition, by refusing to pay any regard to
the objective pursued, goes to opposite extremes: also measures taken for quite
different purposes than regulating trade like for instance a temporal blockage of
imports of meat of suspicious quality in order to protect national health would fall
within the scope of Article 113 because the instrument used is a classic instrument
of commercial policy.
C.W.A. Timmermans, Common Commercial Policy (Article 113 EEC) and International
Trade in Services, in Du DROIT INTERNATIONAL AU DROIT DE L'INTIGRATION: LIBER

AMICORUM PIERRE PESCATORE 675, 681 (1987) (emphasis added).
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effect in intra-Community trade. Although environmental issues arguably fall under Article 36,' they constitute mandatory requirements that
permit derogations from Article 30.136 Since the EC adopted no internal
measures under either Articles 130S or 100A regarding the sale or consumption of contaminated vegetables, the Member States under the
mandatory requirements analysis still remained free to legislate in this
area. However, as Professor Eeckhout observed, the Chernobyl Regulation had an essentially different goal compared to measures which the
Member States might have pursued to prevent importation of contaminated food. The Regulation sought to "ensure that agricultural
products and processed agricultural products intended for human consumption and likely to be contaminated are introduced into the Community only according to common arrangements," and to "maintain,
without having unduly adverse effects on trade between the Community
and third countries, the unified nature of the market and prevent deflections of trade."'137 The Court, after citing these aims, observed that the
Regulation establishes uniform rules regarding the conditions of importation of potentially contaminated agricultural products. Without such a
Regulation, trade patterns could be altered and competition distorted.
Thus, the Court decided that the Regulation was rightly adopted on the
basis of Article 113.138
Eeckhout agreed that the effect of this decision means the common
commercial policy can harmonize at the external level of national policies in areas such as the protection of public health or public security
provided that a sufficient link with trade is alleged. The Community
must claim that a uniform external regime is necessary to avoid deflections of trade or distortions of competition within the internal market.
Such a framework of harmonization circumvents the issue of exclusive
measures are essentially
Community powers because these Community
1 39
different from existing national regulation.
If the Community can show that external regulation of intellectual
property is sufficiently linked to trade and that without such regulation
competitive distortions would occur, then the EC's interest in intellectual
property is "essentially different" from that of the Member States.

135. See Ludwig Kriamer, Envirornental Protection and Article 30 EEC Treaty, 30
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 111, 119-20 (1993).
136. Case 302/86, 1988 E.C.R. at 4622.
137. Council Regulation 3955/87 on the Conditions Governing Imports of Agricultural
Products Originating in Third Countries Following the Accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear

Power-Station, 1987 O.J. (L 371) 14 (emphasis added).
138. Chernobyl, 1990 E.C.R. at 1-1549.
139. Eeckhout, supra note 35, at 99-100.
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Consequently, the EC faces no exclusivity problem. While this facile
approach has visceral appeal, it suffers from some drawbacks. First,
although varying levels of aggressiveness among the Member States'
protection of intellectual property rights can lead to trade deflections and
competition distortions, avoiding such distortions does not result directly
from regulating intellectual property internationally. The Commission's
actions address what other nations have done or failed to do rather than
how goods enter or leave the EC. Moreover, the distortion/deflection
standard defies simple qualification and invites wide interpretations, and
this approach fails to explain the status of Member State powers after
the EC acts externally. Unlike intellectual property, the Chernobyl
example involved a subject -

radiation contaminated food -

for which

no Member State had a law. Beyond possibly endorsing the Commission's view, Chernobyl provides little guidance regarding permitted
measures of equivalent effect and the common commercial policy.
The two decisions concerning Member State application of intellectual property law, a measure of equivalent effect, and external EC
trade indirectly support Community competence over intellectual property matters. The EMI case examined whether EMI, the legal owner of the
Columbia trademark in the Member States, can prevent the importation
of records, which also bear the Columbia trademark, from a third country in which the records were lawfully produced and marketed (CBS,
Inc. was the holder of the trade mark outside the EC).4° The Court of
Justice stated that the Articles 30-34 analysis regarding measures of
equivalent effect has no place in an issue involving the free movement
of goods between the EC and a third country.14' The Court of Justice
held that
the exercise of a [trademark] right in order to prevent the marketing of products coming from a third country under an identical
mark, even if this constitutes a measure having equivalent effect to
a quantitative restriction, does not affect the free movement of
goods between Member States and thus does not come under the
prohibitions set out in Article 30 et seq. of the Treaty ....

In such

circumstances, the exercise of a [trademark] does not, in fact,
jeopardize the unity of the Common Market which Article 30 et
14 2
seq. are intended to ensure.

140. EMI, 1976 E.C.R. at 813.
141. Id. at 845.

142. Id. at 845-46. The Court also stated that complying with articles 9 and 10 does not
necessarily means that goods may be marketed and freely moved throughout the EC in
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In addition, and of more importance, the Court declared that, with
respect to measures of equivalent effect,
the provisions of the Treaty on common commercial policy do not
.,. lay down any obligation on the part of the Member States to
extend to trade with third countries the binding principles govern*ing the free movement of goods between Member States and in
particular the prohibition of measures having an effect equivalent
to quantitative restrictions. The arrangements concluded by the
Community in certain international agreements such as the ACPEEC Convention of Lomd'... or the agreements with Sweden and
Switzerland ...form part of such a policy and do not constitute
the performance of a duty incumbent on the Member States under
the Treaty.'43
Furthermore, the Court declared that Regulation No. 1439/74 (the predecessor of Regulation 288/82) on common import rules is only a quantitative restriction to excluding measures having equivalent effect.'" By
stating that the Regulation related only to quantitative restrictions, the
Court of Justice avoided having to deal explicitly with the issues presented by trade liberalization agreements, including measures of equivalent effect. Thus, the question remains unanswered. 45 In any event, it
appears that national measures of equivalent effect are not expressly or
impliedly prohibited, but may be prohibitted as a matter of policy within
46
agreements governing trade relations with a particular third party.
In another case, Polydor, the Court of Justice examined the legality
of a Member State invoking intellectual property rights to prevent the
importation of recordings lawfully produced and marketed in a country
with which the EC had a trade agreement containing provisions similar
to Articles 30-36.' The goods were marketed and produced in Portugal
with the consent of the EC right holder and subsequently were imported
into the Community - a classic exhaustion of rights scenario. The
Court, however, found that similarity in terms was insufficient reason to
transpose to the provisions of the trade agreement the principles derived
from the Article 36 case law applying to the protection of intellectual
property and the free movement of goods. Indeed, the Court declared

contravention of the trade mark rights. Id. at 846; see V6LKER, supra note 6, at 93-94.
143. EMI, 1976 E.C.R. at 846-47.
144. Id.
145. Govaere, supra note 7, at 213.
146. V6LKER, supra note 6, at 103.

147. Polydor, 1982 E.C.R. at 329.

Fall 1994]

Intellectual Property and External Power of the EC

219

that in the context of the trade agreement, restrictions on trade of goods
on the grounds of intellectual property protection, which would not be48
possible in the context of intra-Community trade, could be justified.,
This non-applicability of the exhaustion doctrine openly discriminates
against third countries because they do not enjoy the same rights as their
Community competitors. The EC right holder can market his intellectual
property in third countries and simultaneously prevent the products he
circulated from being imported and exploited in the Member States.
Like EMI, Polydor's implications for the relationship between
measures of equivalent effect and the common commercial policy rest
largely in what is not said. Govaere commented regarding these two
cases:
In the EMI case, the Court stated that the Treaty rules on common
commercial policy do not oblige Member States to extend to trade
with third countries the principles applying to the free movement
of goods. In the Polydor case, the Member States were not obliged
to do so either on the basis of an agreement merely containing
provisions similar to [A]rticles 30 and 36 [of the Treaty]. Applying
an a contrario reasoning, this implies that in both cases the Member States were, however, free to do so. But what would the situation be like, were an agreement concluded with a third country on
the basis of Article 113 [of the Treaty] to contain an express provision stating that the exhaustion principle either applies or does not
apply. In the latter hypothesis, one could claim that this is an open
discrimination vis-A-vis trade with the third country concerned.
And in the first hypothesis ...

would the Member States then not

be obliged by virtue of the common commercial policy to extend
this principle to trade with third countries and thus lose concurrent
competences in this field? A conclusion in the affirmative would
not prejudice the competence of the Member States to legislate and
conclude agreements with third countries as far as the essence of
intellectual property rights is concerned. Merely the way in which
the rights derived from intellectual property protection could be
be curtailed on the basis of the common commerexercised would
49
cial policy.
Echoing the case law's exercise/existence rubric, Govaere sees a distinction between the Member States' concerns and the EC's regarding
intellectual property. In other words, extending the common commercial

148. Id. at 348-49.

149. Govaere, supra note 7, at 214-15.
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policy to include intellectual property does not alter the EC's essential
interests.
Although not explicitly, both Chernobyl and Polydor support the
idea that externally, the EC deals with issues distinct from Member
State competence. Eeckhout bases the distinction on the necessity of
avoiding trade deflections and competitive distortions, which is the
essential policy goal of the EC, arguing that national measures simply
do not have this aim."S Govaere also sees a distinction but one that
already reflects the respective competencies of the EC and the Member
States. Extending the commercial policy to this field, which is not
disallowed by EMI and Polydor, would not change those basic interests.
In any event, while the Court of Justice has not defined precisely
the scope of the common commercial policy, it nonetheless permits the
Community to authorize specific derogations from its exclusivity at the
end of the transitional period.' 5 ' The Court of Justice required that such
derogations be strictly interpreted and applied'52 but failed to specify
what constitutes specific authorization. In its later decision in Bulk
Oil,"3 however, the Court allowed a54 generous interpretation of what is
considered a specific authorization.
In Bulk Oil, the Court held that a provision, Annex 10 of the 1969
general regime on exports,' 55 which excluded a number of products,
including oil, from the principle of freedom of exportation, was suffi-

150. Eeckhout, supra note 35, at 100.

Take the case of export controls on dual use goods. Insofar as such controls
genuinely serve to protect public security, one should indeed acknowledge that they

are not measures of commercial policy, and that the Member States have retained
the competence to operate a system of controls. On the other hand, in case the
Community would develop a common system of such controls, 'harmonizing' the
existing national systems, this would be a measure of commercial policy, because
it aims at creating uniform conditions of exportation. It goes without saying, of
course, that once the Community has acted by virtue of its competence to pursue a
commercial policy, the Member States lose all powers to adopt autonomous national measures.
Id.
151. Donckerwolcke, 1976 E.C.R. at 1937. The Court recognized that the Community
had not completely established a common commercial policy. Accordingly, derogations were
permitted under Article 115. Id.; see Bronckers, supra note 115, at 65. The Donckerwolcke
ruling applies to all aspects of commercial policy and not only to measures concerning
imports.
152. Donckerwolcke, 1976 E.C.R. at 1937.
153. Case 174/84, Bulk Oil (ZUG) A.G. v. Sun Int'l Ltd, 1986 E.C.R. 559.
154. C.W.A. Timmermans, Community Commercial Policy on Textiles: A Legal Im-

broglio, in

PROTECTIONISM,

supra note 19, at 159, 161; see also Vdlker, supra note 30, at

106-08.
155. Commission Regulation 2603/69, supra note 113.
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cient specific authorization for the United Kingdom's restrictive oil
export regime in 1979. Annex 10 did not precisely describe the product,
the measures permitted, or any sort of time frame for the authorized activity.1 56 The provision was only specific in that it explicitly listed what
was covered; it was not based on an evaluation of the situation in 1979
and the following years. 57 Moreover, if Annex 10 indefinitely
authorized Member States to adopt whatever measures they believed
necessary, then it would have created an internal division of power or a
system of concurrent competencies. 158 Should it be determined that the
common commercial policy extends to intellectual property, the generous understanding of specific derogation may prove extremely useful to
explain Member State activity.
c. Academia Weighs In
Not unexpectedly, the lack of consensus about Article 113 has
provided fertile grounds for scholars, including Edmund Vo1ker, C.W.A.
Timmermans, Jacques Bourgeois, C.D. Ehlermann, Geoge le Tallac, and
Richard Lauwaars to advance their theories regarding its scope. Of those
various theories, only Vo1ker's and Timmermans' views address the
issue of sanctioned measures of equivalent effect (either through Article
36 or mandatory requirements) within the common commercial policy.'59

156. V61ker, supra note 30, at 107.
157. Timmermans, supra note 154, at 161.
158. Volker, supra note 30, at 107.

[lI]t must be pointed out here that Polydor and EMI create some strain with the
Donckerwolcke doctrine. It will be recalled that the Court held that Article 30's
rules prohibiting measures having equivalent effect on intra-Community trade had

no application on relations with third countries even if there is a directly effective
bilateral trade agreement between the EC and the third country containing provisions similar to Article 30.
Bronckers, supra note 115, at 75. Although one may assume that national quota-equivalent
restrictions are of a commercial policy nature and so fall under Article 113, the Court was not
asked and did not inquire whether the Community specifically authorized the measures. Id.
159. This discussion purposely leaves aside Peter Gildorf's intriguing suggestion that the
EC simply drop the common commercial policy's exclusivity in those fields which do not fall
under the traditional definition of a commercial measure. Essentially, Gildorf does not see any
Treaty or practical justification for exclusivity regarding new areas of commercial policy.
Peter Gildorf, Portie et Dlinitation des Competencies Communautaires en Matiire de
Politique Commercial, in 323 REVUE DU MARCHI COMMUN 195, 197 (1987). Gildorf's

proposal represents a radical departure from established jurisprudence: he solves the problem
by changing the rules, which is simply not practical - especially considering, given the
Maastricht Treaty, there appears no desire to go in that direction. Moreover, he does not
consider the fundamental difference between a prohibitive regime (Article 30) and a policy
regime (Article 113). VOLKER, supra note 6, at 191. Further, he fails to resolve the issues of
dueling competencies and the potential disruption of market unity.
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The predominant school, the per se/rule of reason analysis, runs as
follows:
All measures [that] regulate openly and specifically trade with third
countries should always be considered as part of the common commercial policy; they are per se measures of commercial policy
unless the Treaty provides for an exception. Other measures should
be considered as part of such policy by a sort of 'rule of reason'
dominant purpose is to influence the Volume or
viz. when their
16
flow of trade. 11
To determine the dominant purpose, both Bourgeois and Ehlermann
have maintained that it should be accomplished in an "objective and
incontestable" manner by examining the agreement (its purpose, Struceffects) and the framework in which the agreeture, instruments, and
161
ment was reached.
Per se commercial policy measures would include:
(a) measures expressly mentioned in Articles 113 and 112 of the
EEC Treaty (tariffs, quotas, protective measures in case of dumping and subsidies, export credits);
(b) measures ancillary to measures under (a) (e.g. customs regulations, procedures for'import and export licenses);
(c) all other formally discriminating measures which are not expressly mentioned and not ancillary in character (e.g. taxes, and
measures of equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions which discriminate openly between intra-Community trade and trade with
third countries. ....).162
Another scholar, Le Tallac, defined the "classical aspects" of the Community's commercial policy to include measures relating to customs

160. Bourgeois, supra note 19, at 6 (emphasis omitted); see also Ehlermann, supra note
20, at 152-53 ("It follows from the fundamental character and the examples given in Article
113 that it covers all measures which regulate openly and specifically trade with third countries, whatever their purpose and motivation might be, unless the Treaty contains a derogation."); KAPTEYN & VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT, supra note 6, at 790 ("The common commer-

cial policy, it may be submitted, embraces all measures (autonomous or convential) which
serve to regulate economic relations with third countries and concern free movement of goods
and related traffic in services and payments.").
161. Bourgeois, supra note 19, at 7. For example, one should ask "is it part of a wider

package deal or is it negotiated within an international organization whose aim is to promote
trade?" Id.; see Ehlermann, supra note 20, at 156. Ehlermann also stated that the number and
hierarchy of goals should be examined but gave no bright line tests to measure them. Lastly,
he suggested examining the motivation of the principle actors (e.g., the Community or the
Member States) regarding the particular legislation. Ehlerman, supra note 20, at 156.
162. Bourgeois, supra note 19, at 6. See Ehlermann, supra note 20, at 153.
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quantitative restrictions such as -import prohibitions and
tariffs and
63
1
quotas.
Timmermans objects to the broad sweep of the per se rule. He
maintains that such a rule extends the common commercial policy to
measures that do not serve a commercial policy objective but rather an
objective such as environmental policy, public health, or something
similar. 164 The per se rule brings matters within the Community's exclusive external competence while internally these matters still belong
under the powers of the Member States. 65
Lauwaars has also criticized the per se analysis insofar as it applies
to measures of equivalent effect. He argues that existing authority does
not permit this extension. Regulation 288/82, the common rules for
imports, states clearly that "importation into the Community of the
products referred to in paragraph I shall be free, and therefore not
subject to any quantitative restriction."' 66 Moreover, Lauwaars asserts
that both the EMI and Bulk Oil decisions stand squarely against applying the per se rule to measures of equivalent effect. 167 EMI held that
Regulation 288/82's provisions "relate only to quantitative restrictions to
the exclusion of measures having equivalent effect," 68 while Bulk Oil
stated that Regulation 2603/69, on the common rules for exports, "does
not prohibit a Member State from imposing new quantitative restrictions
'or measures having equivalent effect' on its exports of oil to nonmember countries."' 69
Timmermans maintains instead that the scope of the common
commercial policy should reflect the internal division of powers - a
parallelism of competencies. Accordingly, all measures that directly affect
trade flow with third countries fall within the common commercial
policy. 7 ' Exceptions to this include measures enacted to protect the public

163. Georges Le Tallec, The Common Commercial Policy of the EEC, 30 INT'L &
COMP. L.Q. 732, 735 (1971). "To sum up," Le Tallec maintains, "commercial policy consists
of all action by the authorities which has a special influence on imports or exports or on the
international exchange of services, in other words which modifies the behaviour of economic

agents, but only in international relations." Id. at 738.
164. C.W.A. Timmermans, La Libre Circulation des Marchandises et ta Politique
Commerciale Commune, in RELATIONS EXTIRIEURES DE LA COMMUNAUTI

EUROPIENNE ET

MARCH9 INTRIEUR: ASPECTS JURIDIQUES ET FONCTIONNELS 91, 95 (P. Demaret ed., 1988);

see also Lauwaars, supra note 2, at 73-75.
165. Timmermans, surpa note 164, at 95.
166. Council Regulation 288/82, supra note 113, art. 1, para. 2.
167. Lauwaars, supra note 2, at 78.
168. EM), 1976 E.C.R. at 847.
169. Lauwaarts, supra note 2, at 78 (footnotes omitted); see also V6lker, supra note 30,
at 105-07.
170. See Timmermans, supra note 134, at 680.
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interests recognized in Article 36 and measures enacted to protect consumers, fair competition, and the other interests under the Court of
Justice's Cassis de Dijon doctrine. 17 ' Timmermans commented further
that
[t]hese residual national powers [that] are accepted by the Treaty can
also be exercised with regard to goods originating from third
countries imported through other Member States where they have
been brought into free circulation. What applies in cases of direct
importation from a third country? Shouldn't Member States remain
empowered to take similar measures and under similar conditions as
they do with regard to intra-community trade in goods? I think so."'
Timmermans' approach has the advantage of creating a uniformed
external regime and not causing deflections of trade. 7 3 More importantly, it complements Govaere's analysis. Govaere reasoned that extending
EC competence to intellectual property would not prejudice the Member
States' competence because the common commercial policy would only
restrict how Member States exercise these rights. 74 Thus, as Timmermans advocates, the parallelism between internal and external com75
petencies would be applied fully.
Volker, however, criticizes both Timmermans' approach and the per
se/rule of reason approach, claiming that they share the same problem.
Each leaves
within the scope of trade policy all sorts of measures taken for
entirely different purposes like public health, consumer protection
or the protection of the environment. Such measures do not fit
within the confines of trade policy which, as part of economic
policy, should be concerned with the commercial conditions of the
171.

Id. In Cassis de Dijon, the Court of Justice expanded the permitted derogations

from Article 30 and expressly included grounds other than those provided by Article 36. The
Court held that trading rules that might hinder intra-Community trade may nonetheless be
permitted under Article 30 provided they are "necessary ... to satisfy mandatory require-

ments relating ... to the effectiveness of fiscal supervision, the protection of the public
health, the fairness of commercial transactions and the defense of the consumer." Cassis de
Dijon, 1979 E.C.R. at 662.
172. Timmermans, supra note 134, at 680. Ehlermann strongly rejected position declaring:
"I do not believe that this objection is valid. The parallelism between internal and external
consequences is intended to strengthen the Community's powers in the external field, not to
weaken them." Ehlermann, supra note 20, at 154.
173. See Timmermans, supra note 134, at 680; Eeckhout, supra note 35, at 94-95.
174. Govaere, supra note 7, at 215. As discussed, the EC regulates the exercise not the
existence of intellectual property. Its external actions parallel its internal; the Member States'

essential interests remain the same.
175. See supra text accompanying notes 162-68.
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entry of foreign goods to the Community
market and of Com17 6
munity goods to the world market.
Additionally, Timmermans' approach suffers from a "wide variety of
opinions on the actual scope and content of the grounds provided.""'
Furthermore, Articles 30-36 and Article 113 have essentially distinct
goals that make parallelism difficult. Articles 30-36 create a system of
prohibitions and exceptions regarding Member State power in the context of establishing the internal market. Article 113, on the other hand,
confers upon the Community the authority and responsibility to build an
external competence. This distinction has been characterized as the
difference between negative (Articles 30-36) and positive (Article 113)
integration. 178

Volker offers a pragmatic solution that recognizes that measures of
equivalent effect play a role in international commercial relations that do
not fit precisely into existing categories.' 79 He thus proposes an alternative approach that builds upon the per selrule of reason analysis by
creating a third category under Article 113, which includes international
instruments primarily designed to regulate, minimize, or stop the effects
of measures of equivalent effect on international trade. 80 Accordingly,
Article 113 extends to:
a)

trade policy instruments per se, i.e. those measures affecting
the price and quantity elements of the market mechanism in
order to determine the commercial conditions on which third
country goods may enter the Community's market, or on
which Community goods may leave the Community for the
world market ...

b) the measures ancillary to trade policy instruments proper ....
This category comprises the measures required for the proper
application of the trade policy instruments of [the first category];
c) all measures [that] do not come within [the first and second
categories] ...

176.

VOLKER,

and [that] have as their essential object to

supra note 6, at 191.

177. Id.

178. Lauwaars, supra note 2, at 79-80 (quoting Opinion 1/75, 1975 E.C.R. at 1363); see
also V6LKER, supra note 6, at 191. Lauwaars maintained, in fact, that the parallelism advocated by Timmermans is "a petitio principii" - a begging of the question. Lauwaars, supra
note 2, at 79.
179. VOLKER, supra note 6, at 196. "[N]ot all international agreements covered by this
criterion [international developments or international state practice] fit into one of the two
categories of either trade policy instruments proper or trade instruments-related measures." Id.
at 195.

180. Id. at 196.
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prohibit, remedy or check the effects on trade caused by the
external application of measures of equivalent effect. Such
measures ensure that the effects of non-trade policy measures
on international trade are minimised as much as possible....
[These measures] do not have "as their object the establishment and functioning of the internal market"

. . .

but rather the

safe-guarding of the effectiveness of trade policy measures,
which are part of economic policy. 18'
V61ker adds that the third category of measures should be evaluated not
in the context of the Community but rather in their international context. 82 As a result, international intellectual property agreements, which
reverse the impact on international trade of measures of equivalent
effect, fall under this third category and thus under Article 113. 83 As for
Member State activity, V61ker has suggested that the proposed Council
decision that Member States accede to the Berne and Rome Conventions
can provide the specific justification in terms of the Donckerwolcke and
Bulk Oil judgments. 84
5. Article 113 and International Intellectual
Property Regulation
Within the Scope
-

Given the broad mandate of the common commercial policy, it is
easy to understand why the Commission based its intellectual property
actions on Article 113. As intellectual property is now perceived, it can
fall within any of the aforementioned descriptions of the commercial
policy. Essentially, the Commission has sought to regulate the external
market through enforcing minimum standards of intellectual property
protection, which is also what the TRIPs negotiations tackle.' 85 This
"essential objective" fulfills Natural Rubber's criteria. 86 Moreover, such
measures undoubtedly seek to harmonize developing world trade - at
least, in the eyes of the Commission and the GATT. Because these
matters openly and specifically regulate trade with third countries, the
per selrule of reason analysis is also satisfied.' 87 Additionally, if the

181. Id. at 196-97.

182. Id. at 197.
183. Id. at 198.
184. Id. The same could be said of Article 21(2)(a) of Council Regulation 288/82, supra
note 113.

185. Govaere; supra note 7, at 204-06.
186. Natural Rubber, 1979 E.C.R. at 2917.

187. What is more, despite EMI's holding, the per se criteria covers measure of equivalent effect. Bourgeois, supra note 19, at 6; Ehlermann, supra note 20, at 153.
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Court of Justice embraced the Commission's view through the
Chernobyl decision, then extending the common commercial policy
becomes even easier. Conceptually extending the common commercial
policy, however, is not the main problem' Rather the issue has always
been whether a theory regarding the common commercial policy can
admit sanctioned Member State activity in seemingly the same field.
Timmermans, as interpreted by Govaere, offers the viscerally most
attractive approach because it bypasses the exclusivity problem by
distinguishing between Member State and Community activity. Moreover, it reflects the division of powers already existing in the Community: the Community regulates the Member States' exercise of intellectual property rights when that exercise may artificially partition the
internal market, while the existence of such rights remain within the
Member States' control. Since the EC already has authority over intellectual property when the exercise of such laws threatens market
integrity, extending the common commercial policy to this field effectively changes nothing. This approach also avoids the problem of
parallelism between mix-matched regimes - between a policy regime
(Article 113) and a prohibitive regime (Articles 30-36): Recall that the
Court of Justice has interpreted intellectual property rights in the internal
market far different from other sanctioned measures of equivalent effect
by not balancing the proportionality of market impact versus Member
State rights, but rather by comparing 'existence versus exercise. Further,
unlike other Article 36 derogations, intellectual property involves personal rights not sovereign state powers.
Timmermans' method, however, has its drawbacks. The integrity of
the internal market is not directly connected to international protection
of intellectual property. Varying degrees of Member State aggressiveness in protecting their nationals' rights can ultimately lead to some
internal market partitioning, but the Community is essentially interested
in other nations' activities. Thus, the parallelism is somewhat strained.
More troublesome, however, is the exercise/existence standard itself. On
a Community level, this concept is difficult and invites case by case
analysis. Internationally, it would be very burdensome if Community
action were constantly threatened by litigation. Furthermore, EC international activity (such as the joining of the Berne and Rome Conventions)
will do more than regulate the exercise of intellectual property by actually creating normative standards.
Volker's approach does not suffer from such problems. The appeal
of his ideas lie in their directness. Unlike Govaere's interpretation of
Timmermans' and unlike Eeckhout, Volker acknowledges that this situation is wholly different and presents challenges that other theories
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cannot adequately address. One cannot base international EC actions on
a concern for internal market integrity because the connection to the
establishment and internal functioning of the internal market is too
slim.' 8 Nonetheless, by the international criteria, intellectual property
matters have become common commercial policy issues. V61ker's new
Article 113 third category covers such measures that aim "to prohibit,
remedy or check the effects on trade caused by the external application
of measures of equivalent effect."'8 9 Given the interpretation of the
Donckerwolcke doctrine, V61ker's reliance on it for Member State
activity is reasonable. To the extent that Community action requires
harmonization of national systems, such as with the proposal that the
Member States accede to the Berne and Rome Conventions, V61ker
recommends that one add Article 100A as another legal basis.' 9°
Even with individual Member States participating as described
above, the partitioning of the internal market by national intellectual
property law remains intact. This will only end if the Community, rather
than the Member States, becomes a party to the conventions (on the
basis of Article 113), thereby leading harmonization laws, developing
one Community system of intellectual property, and removing the
national barriers.' 9' This tracks the approach that the Commission has
already taken regarding, its proposal to accede to the Berne and Rome
Conventions. ,92
The only disadvantage in V61ker's approach also lies in its directness. Stating that the Community's exclusive power extends to intellectual property rights and that Member State activity stems from a
delegation of EC power is confronting. Govaere has commented that it
"clearly goes against the traditional view that intellectual property rights
are part of their sovereign rights."'' 93 Indeed, the Council has trouble
accepting the Commission's proposal.' 94 Consequently, Govaere's interpretation of Timmermans' may have more appeal because it claims not
to change existing relations. This, however, is not a legal argument but
a policy one. Ultimately, the choice depends on how the Court of Jus-

188. For a discussion of implied powers, see supra part B.
189. VOLKER, supra note 6, at 196.

190. Id. at 198. "International agreements concerning in essence the actual content of one
or more ... regulations will have to be approved by the Community, depending on the
subject concerned, on the basis of either Article 100(A) or e.g. Article 130(R)(5) regarding
environmental measures ..... Id. at 196.
191. Id. at 198.
192. See Commission Proposal on the Berne and Rome Conventions, supra note 14.
193. Govaere, supra note 7, at 220.
194. Id. at 220-21; see also V6LKER, supra note 6, at 198.
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tice measures the impact of international intellectual property matters on
the internal market and to what degree it will accept a hazy standard in
the common commercial policy. If the Council's reticence is any indication, part of the answer will also depend on the political climate.
B. Implied External Competence and International
Intellectual Property Issues
"The most significant difference between external competence based
on implied powers and the competence to conduct a commercial policy
lies in the policy element. Implied powers do not require [that] a genuine comprehensive policy be developed."'' 95 Furthermore, a derived
external competence need not be exclusive. Exclusivity depends on
whether the Community receives its power from the Treaty or its application."'' 96 In other words, the particular nature of the internal source
decides the extent of the exclusivity of the derived external power. 197 As
shall be shown below, the jurisprudence regarding implied external
powers is extremely liberal. Whether the EC's implied external power
includes intellectual property requires an interpretation of internal Community legislation and its goals. While existing Community harmonization regarding intellectual property is probably insufficient to establish a
derived external power, the demands of establishing and maintaining an
internal market may provide the basis for external action. Again, the
question depends on how one interprets the impact of international
intellectual property upon the integrity of the internal market.
1. The Basics
The ERTA case introduced the concept of implied external Community action.' 98 Simply stated, when the Community has adopted
common rules in the internal sphere, it must also have the power. to
enter into any international agreements that affect these rules or alter
their scope. 99 To determine whether the Community has the authority to
enter a particular international agreement, the whole scheme of the
Treaty, in addition to the substantive provisions, must be considered. 200
The Community's authority not only may be expressly conferred by the

195. Eeckhout, supra note 35, at 85.
196. KAPTEYN & VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT, supra note 6, at 773.
197. "The implied external powers cannot be more comprehensive than their source
the internal powers." Timmermans, supra note I, at 21.
198. ERTA, 1971 E.C.R. at 263.

199. See Bourgeois, supra note 18, at 100.
200. ERTA, 1971 E.C.R. at 274.

-
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Treaty, but also it may flow from other Treaty provisions and from
measures that the Community institutions adopted within the framework
of those provisions.2 °'
In the Kramer case, the Court of Justice expanded the basis of
implicit external power by determining that the Community had the
competence to enter international commitments regarding ocean biological resource conservation. 2°2 Although the Treaty provided no express
authorization, the Court explained:
Article 210 provides that 'the Community shall have legal personality.' This provision, placed at the head of Part Six of the
Treaty, devoted to 'General and Final Provisions,' means that in its
external relations the Community enjoys the capacity to enter into
international commitments over the whole field of objectives defined in Part One of the Treaty, which Part Six supplements.2 3
The Court further declared:
To establish in a particular case whether the Community has authority to enter into international commitments, regard must be had
to the whole scheme of the Community law no less than to its substantive provisions. Such authority arises not only from an express
conferment by the Treaty, but may equally flow implicitly from
other provisions of the Treaty, from the Act of Accession and from
measures adopted, within the framework of those provisions, by the
Community institutions. (
Furthermore, the Court declared that the Community derived its power
to regulate fishing not simply from internal rules and other provisions

201. Id.
202. Joined Cases 3, 4 & 6/76, Kramer et. al., 1976 E.C.R. 1279 [hereinafter Kramer].

203. Id. at 1308. Burrows wrote regarding this reasoning:
Here was a non sequitur of monumental proportions. The raison d'etre of a provision which gave the Community legal personality could just as easily have been
held to be that the Community must have the legal capacity to exercise the powers
which are specifically conferred upon it by the EEC Treaty. The only necessary
implication to be drawn from the existence of Article 210 is that the authors of the
Treaty must have contemplated that there would be some circumstances in which it
would [be necessary] to have such personality.
Burrows, supra note 2, at 113.
204. Kramer, 1976 E.C.R. at 1308. The Court concluded that the Community had the in-

ternal power to take fishery conservation measures after reviewing the scope of Articles 38 to
46 of the Treaty, Council Regulations 2141/70 and 2142/70 as well as Article 102 of the Act
of Accession. Kramer, 1976 E.C.R. at 1308-09. This was the first instance the Court used
the expression "implicitly."
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but from "the very nature of things. 2 °5
In Opinion 1/76, the Court continued to expand the range of implicit
powers by holding:
[W]henever Community law has created for the institutions of the
Community powers within its internal system for the purpose of
attaining a specific objective, the Community has authority to enter
into the international commitments necessary for the attainment of
that objective even in the absence of an express provision in that
connection. 2116
Thus, entering international commitments is both expressly authorized
by the Treaty and implicitly permitted by its provisions.2 °7 The Court
refers here not only to the Treaty but also to "Community law." The
Court continued:
This is particularly so in all cases in which the internal power has
already been used in order to adopt measures which come within
the attainment of the of common policies. It is, however, not
limited to that eventuality. Although the internal Community
measures are only adopted when the international agreement is
concluded and made enforceable ... the power to bind the Com-

munity vis t vis third countries nevertheless flows by implication
from the provisions of the Treaty creating the internal power and in
so far as the participation of the Community in the international
agreement is ...

necessary for the attainment of one of the objec-

tives of the Community.

°8

The Court's far reaching language carries great implications.
It must be emphasized that the Community's implied external power
stems from a necessity to assume international obligations. In ERTA,
although the Court noted that Article 75(a)(1) empowers the Council to
adopt common rules of transport to or from the territory of a Member
State or across the territory of one or more Member States, this was in
itself insufficient basis. There had to be a necessity. The Court stated
that "the powers of the Community extend to relationships arising from
international law, and hence involve the need in the sphere in question

205. Kramer, 1976 E.C.R. at 1309. Burrows commented that ascertaining the nature of

things is "a formidable task even for someone with an intimate knowledge of the Community
from the inside, and even more formidable for somebody advising a third state on whether it
should negotiate with the Community or with one or more of the individual Member States
which belong to it." Burrows, supra note 2, at 114.
206. Opinion 1/76, 1977 E.C.R. at 755.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 755 (emphasis added).
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for agreements with third countries concerned. ' 209 "ERTA was construed
as having consecrated the Community's virtual capacity, or potential
power. The capacity becomes real, the power becomes actual upon the
entry into force of common rules. 212 Later case law demonstrates that
potential power becomes effective and thus exclusive once Community
international action becomes necessary. 21 ' Both Kramer and Opinion
1/76 also relied upon the theme of necessity of external powers to
accomplish EC goals.
The question of exclusivity of implied powers defies easy definition.
Essentially, external powers are exclusive if the Community also possesses
internal competence. Either the Treaty may establish an internal power as
exclusive, which will result in making the derived external power also
exclusive, or the exercise of an internal power leads to an exclusive
derived power because the internal power requires a cession of competence from the Member States to the Community. In the latter instance,
whether this has occurred depends upon interpretation. For example, the
establishment of common rules in the context of a common policy implies
that a transfer of competence has occurred. However, there are no brightline rules. Not everything the Community has created in conjunction with
the Member States amounts to a common policy. Further, common rules
need not only be found in regulations. Ultimately, the question of whether
the cession of competence by the Member States to the EC in particular
field warrants an exclusive derived external power depends upon the
intensity of the internal arrangement. 1 2
Accordingly, to have implied external competence regarding intellectual property matters, there must exist internal Community rules or
goals which require external competence for their accomplishment.
2. Community Goals Regarding Intellectual Property
The Community has recognized that differences among the Member
States' intellectual property laws can undermine the efficiency and idea
of a single market.21 3 The fact that intellectual property interests are one
of Article 36's permitted derogations does not mean such powers

209. ERTA, 1971 E.C.R. at 275.
210. Barav, supra note 26, at 36 (footnotes omitted).

211. Id.
212. KAPTEYN & VERLOREN VAN TIIEMAAT, supra note 6, at 773-74.
213. See, e.g., Completing the Internal Market: White Paper from the Commission to the

European Council, COM(85)310 final; Commission Copyright Paper, supra note 11;
Amended Proposal for a Council Directive Harmonizing the Term of Protection of Copyright
and Certain Related Rights, COM(92)602 final.
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permanently belong to the Member States. 1 4
Article 36 is not designed to reserve certain matters to the exclusive jurisdiction of Member States but permits national laws to
derogate from the principle of free movement of goods to the
extent to which such derogation is and continues to be justified for
the attainment of the objectives referred to in that article. 1 5
In short, the Member States have lost the power to use national rules to
protect mandatory requirements and Article 36 interests once the Community has taken over, secured, and acted to protect them 2 6
The Community has had great success regulating trademarks. On
December 20, 1993, the Council issued a regulation that created a
registration procedure that enables trademark protection "throughout the
Community, regardless of frontiers. '2, 7 The EC established uniform
protection throughout the Community because it promotes continuous,
balanced, and harmonious economic development by simulating conditions of a national market and because it provides a legal method for
adapting to Community-scale activities. 211
In addition to trademark regulation, the Community has begun other
initiatives to harmonize intellectual property laws. 2 ' 9 For example, the
EC has made great progress in patent law although, admittedly, outside
the framework of the Community.220 In 1986, the Council enacted a
regulation developing a common procedure to prevent the release of
counterfeit goods coming from third countries in the Community. 221
Moreover, in the Green Paper on Copyright and the Challenges of
Technology, the Commission declares that copyright issues require
immediate action and outlines various courses of action that should lay

214. In Case 62/79, intellectual property also constitutes a mandatory requirement. Case

62/79, 1980 E.C.R. at 881.
215. Case 35/76, Simenthal v. Italian Minister for Finance, 1976 E.C.R. 1871, 1886; see
also Dassonville, 1974 E.C.R. at 852; Case 5/77, Tedeschi v. Denkavit Commerciale, 1977
E.C.R. 1555, 1576.
216. VOLKER, supra note 6, at 180.
217. Council Regulation 40/94, 1994 O.J. (L 11) 1, 1.
218. Id. It is worth noting that the Community trade mark does not replace national trade
mark laws which the Regulation states shall continue "to be necessary for those undertakings
which do not want protection of their trade marks at Community level." Id.
219. See Amended Commission Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Community
Trade Mark, 1984 O.J. (C 230) 1.
220. See respectively Council Directive 89/104 of 21 December 1988 to Approximate
the Laws of the Member States in Relation to Trade Marks, 1989 O.J. (L 40) 1,and Convention on the Grant of European Patents, Oct. 5, 1973, 13 I.L.M. 270.
221. Council Regulation 3842/86, 1986 O.J. (L 357) 1.
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the foundation for future legislation.222 On May 14, 1992, the Council
adopted a resolution calling on all Member States to adopt the Berne
and Rome Conventions.223 More recently, the Commission has proposed
that the Council harmonize the copyright laws of the Community along
the lines of the Beme and Rome Conventions. 24 Little, however, has
been done so far regarding industrial design law.225
Regarding the harmonization of intellectual property, a trend exists
away from Member States creating intellectual preperty rights and
towards Community initiatives and standards. As shown, the EC has
increased its legislative efforts, which thus preempt, to a degree,
Member State activity. Moreover, the court decisions clearly
demonstrate that the exercise of intellectual property must not be at the
expense of the integrity of the internal market. Accordingly, Member
State power is correspondingly circumscribed.226
Nonetheless, a trend does not mean achieved harmonization.
Generally, Community regimes have been established in addition to
national rules governing intellectual property so that enterprises can treat
the community as a single market. 27 As mentioned, the Community patent
was attained not through the harmonization process but by intrastate
negotiations. In any event, national regimes still continue. What is more,
harmonization may not be enough. The Court of Justice has held that "[i]n
the absence of such unification, the national character of the protection
of industrial property and the variations between the different legislative
systems ... are capable of creating obstacles" to the free movement of
goods and competition.228 Similarly, the Council has remarked regarding
trademarks that "the barrier of territoriality of the rights conferred on
proprietors of [trademarks] by the laws of the Member States cannot be
removed by approximation of laws .... [Trademarks] need to be
created [that] are governed by a uniform Community law directly applicable in all Community States.2 29 In short, harmonization does not
mean the end of territorialization.2 30

222. Green Paper on Copyright and the Challenge of Technology--Copyright Issues
Requiring Immediate Action, COM(88)172 final; see Friden, supra note 99, at 216.

223. Council Resolution of 14 May 1992, supra note 15, at I.
224. Amended Proposal for a Council Directive Harmonizing the Term of Protection of
Copyright and Certain Related Rights, 1993 O.J. (C 27) 7.
225. See Beier, supra note 102, at 133-34.

226. Friden, supra note 99, at 217.
227. Wissels, supra note 99, at 23.

228. Case 24/67, Parke, Davis v. Centrafarm, 1968 E.C.R. 55, 71.
229. Council Regulation 40/94, 1994 O.J. (L 11) 1, 1.

230. For example, Council Directive 89/104, supra note 220, continues to apply the
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Although there has. been much progress towards harmonization of
intellectual property rights, particularly with respect to trademarks,23' the
legal situation remains sharply divided. Industrial property protection,
patent grants, industrial designs, and trademark registration remain the
responsibility of the individual Member States, whose protection extends
only to their territories. Individual property rights must still be acquired
for each individual Member State and can still. conflict with other
Member States' industrial property rights. In short, a genuine internal
market for intellectual property has not yet come into existence.
As long as the protection of industrial property is a matter of
national legislation, the rights granted must be guaranteed by national legislation, because European industrial property rights have
not replaced all national rights; this is the present status of the law
within the Community and will remain so for some time.232
Accordingly, it is difficult to assert that the level of harmonization
creates a basis for external Community competence in intellectual
property.
Nevertheless, interpreting and applying the Treaty's broad and
uncertain language will intrigue academia, on the one hand, and frustrate
practitioners, on the other.233 That harmonization of intellectual property
laws fails to provide a suitable foundation does not end the inquiry. One
needs to turn to the basic goals of the Treaty.
Article 8a requires the Community to adopt measures aimed at
progressively establishing the internal market.234 To this end, the Treaty
has directed that the Council harmonize the Member State measures that
235
directly affect the establishment or functioning of the common market
or concern the establishment and the functioning of the internal
market.236 Accordingly, if one can reasonably argue that individual
Member State intellectual property laws when applied externally to the
Community can lead to distortions of competition and diversions of
trade within the EC, then the Community has the power and obligation
to harmonize such laws. While it is true that the harmonization would
affect laws relating to external matters, "there are no indications

exhaustion principle thus permitting Member States to exclude goods from their territory.
231. See id.; Beier, supra note 102, at 138-39.
232. Beier, supra note 102, at 132, 143.
233. Burrows, supra note 2, at 115.
234. EEC TREATY art. 8a.
235. Id. art. 100.
236. Id. art. 100a.
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whatever that the Chapter in the Treaty concerning harmonisation is
restricted to measures applying solely to intra-Community trade. 237 In
any event, the Community has already applied harmonization directives
that affect external matters based upon Article 100A without additionally referring to Article 113.238
Beyond its direct simplicity, the great charm of an Article 100A
argument is that it avoids the problems brought on by Article 113's
exclusivity. Article 100A applied externally to regulate trade does not
demand that the Member States refrain from all activity affecting intellectual property. Unlike the internal application of national measures,
which would have to be based on Article 36, or which fulfill mandatory
requirements, external application of national measures creates no legal
problems because there exists no prohibition against their application.239
Problems exist, however, with this approach. First, similar to
Govaere's interpretation of Timmermans, the connection between the
international regulation of intellectual property and the establishment
and functioning of the internal market are, at best, indirect. As Vo1ker
maintained, international intellectual property measures are primarily
designed to regulate, minimize, or stop the effects on international trade
of measures of equivalent effect.2' Such regulations act to safeguard the
effectiveness of trade policy measures 24' and not to ensure competition
or prevent trade distortion within the EC; therefore, they more properly
belong under Article 113.242
Furthermore, such use of Article 100A suffers from the breadth of
its implications. If Article 100A can reach international intellectual
property issues even with such an attenuated connection to the internal
market, there can be little beyond its grasp. Its potential reach would
intimidate Member States that may see a wholesale infringement on
their sovereignty. The same holds true of the implied power doctrine in
general. Recalling what the Court stated in Opinion 1/76, the Community had the implied power to enter international commitments to
obtain objectives created by its internal power, especially where the
internal power already has been used to adopt measures falling within
the attainment of common policies. 243 The Court, then, opened the door

237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.

supra note 6, at 192.
Id.
Id. at 193.
Id. at 196.
Id. at 197. Trade policy measures are part of economic policy. Id.
See discussion supra Part A.5.
Opinion 1/76, 1971 E.C.R. at 755.
VOLKER,
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very wide and added, "[i]t is, however, not limited to that
eventuality."244 This carries great potential power, and the Community
has backed far away from this holding. "The political climate for actual
application of the Opinion 1/76 construction has so far not been particularly favourable; that much may be clear from the fact that up till
now the Council has refused to make use of it as compared with a
regular application of the ERTA construction. ,,245th
In short, the Con
Com
munity has far reaching means to accomplish its ends but these means
have equally far reaching implications for Member State sovereignty.
While there may be a legal foundation, the Council has been reluctant to
follow such an open-ended path.
Conceivably, Article 235 could also serve as a foundation for external Community power. 246 The essential criteria of Article 235, absent
the procedural requirements, restates the Article itself and may be reduced to three elements: 1) Community action should prove necessary;
2) the action must be in the course of the operation of the common
market; and 3) the action must be to attain one of the objectives of the
common market. The Court of Justice has stated that "Article 235 offers
a supplementary means of action and applies only in the cases which the
Treaty has not provided the necessary powers for realization of the
object in view.,, 2 4' Given the Commission's present stance regarding its
powers over intellectual property, it is doubtful that it will now pursue
such a foundation. In any event, this approach also suffers from the
same indirect connection between international intellectual measures and
the establishment of the internal market.
CONCLUSION

The question at the beginning of this study was not whether the
Community could exercise external power over intellectual property but
how. Three alternatives have been described - Govaere's interpretation
of Timmermans' approach, V61ker's approach, and the approach of
using implied powers through Article 100A. Govaere's interpretation of
Timmermans presents the most viscerally attractive approach since it

244. Id. (emphasis added).
245. VOLKER, supra note 6, at 200; see also Bourgeois, supra note 18, at 102.
246. See ERTA, 1971 E.C.R. at 283. Article 235 reads: "If action by the Community
should prove necessary to attain, in the course of the operation of the common market, one of
the objectives of the Community and this Treaty has not provided the necessary powers, the
Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after .consulting
the European Parliament, take the appropriate measures." EEC TREATY art. 235. Like the
conditions for the application of applied powers, a necessity for action must exist.
247. Joined Cases 73 & 74/63, Handelsvereniging Rotterdam v. Minister Von Landbouw,
1964 E.C.R. 1, 13.
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sees the Community's international activity regarding intellectual
property essentially as an external application of a power it already has
possessed. Relying on the existence/exercise analysis and a concern for
the internal market's integrity, the Community can act to protect European intellectual property rights overseas. Nothing new, the argument
goes, has happened. Concern for the establishment and function of the
internal market also drives the Article 100A approach. This argument is
the most direct since its basic qualification is that regulating intellectual
property internationally is important to the workings of the internal
market. While one could make a colorable argument about market
impact for either approach, in, both cases it is indirect. The Community
interest in intellectual property internationally concerns primarily what
non-EC countries are doing in their markets with European goods. The
object of intellectual property protection, which constitutes a measure of
equivalent effect, does not fit precisely within traditional notions of
trade measures. It must be admitted that intellectual property's international dimension presents a new set of challenges to the EC that cannot
easily be recast as "business as usual." For this reason, Volker, with his
pragmatic assessment of the limits of Community powers and theories
and of international realities, offers the most convincing argument.
Essentially, V61ker recognizes that measures of equivalent effect
play a role in international commercial relations which do not belong
precisely to existing categories, yet undeniably play a role in international trade. Accordingly, he would extend Article 113 to include:
all measures ... which have as their essential object to prohibit,
remedy or check the effects on trade caused by the external applications of measures of equivalent effect. Such measures ensure
that the effects of non-trade policy measures on international trade
are minimized as much as possible ....
[These measures] do not
have "as their object the establishment and functioning of the
internal market". . . but rather the safe guarding of the effectiveness of trade policy measures, which are part of economic
policy.248
The problem of exclusivity is handled by the generous understanding of
power derogation as developed in the Bulk Oil and Donckerwolcke
decisions. Whether his ideas shall be followed depends not upon legal
arguments but instead upon policy questions. The key consideration is
the importance of the status quo. Both V61ker and the implied powers
argument give intellectual property power to the Community, which

248.

V6LKER,

supra note 6, at 196-97.
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goes against the traditional division of power and thus represents an
encroachment upon Member State sovereignty. This underscores the
inherent attraction of Govaere's interpretation of Timmermans' approach: it claims to change nothing. That may be enough of an appeal
to overcome the inherent imprecision surrounding the existence/exercise
standard.
Regardless of the justification, it will remain a post hoc explanation.
No matter how one views the circumstances that led to the Commission's actions, the Community has assumed new powers that, at best,
only debatably belonged to it. This is not intended to suggest that somehow the EC can expand where it wants. After all, the Council will
prevent unauthorized or threatening growths of EC competence regardless of the Commission's assertions. The Community could do this
precisely because the common commercial policy is so broadly written,
and if the Maastricht Treaty is any indication, the Member States are
satisfied with the existing structure of the EC's external powers. While
drafting a clearer statement of powers has its appeal, it also risks losing
the malleable and evolving nature that characterizes the EC external
competence. Accordingly, the EC can expect more exercises as this
study represents.

